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TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE LAW OF
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
John M. Czarnetzky*
INTRODUCTION
E CONOMICS is a science of human action. The focus of eco-
nomic analysis, therefore, must be the subjective perceptions,
knowledge, and context of the individual acting in the marketplace.'
The economist must account for the inescapable fact that acting per-
sons face radical uncertainty about the future state of the world.
Quite often, people are genuinely surprised by events as they unfold
in time. The true challenge for the economist, therefore, is to under-
stand and predict the individual's subjective response in the face of
uncertainty about the world, rather than to derive the individual's ac-
tions solely by the objective reality surrounding him.2 One logical im-
plication of such a subjectivist approach is that the value of a good is
what some individual is willing to pay for it, not a value derived from
objective facts about the good.3 It is the relation of the individual to
things, not something inherent in things themselves, that ought to be
the focus of economics.4
Moreover, knowledge is highly diffused among individuals in a soci-
ety. The beauty of the market is that it spontaneously coordinates,
without a central authority guiding it (because no central authority
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi Law School. B.S., Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (1982); J.D., University of Virginia School of Law
(1989). I thank Adam Stone, Christopher McNulty, and Kimberly Jones for research
assistance that aided me in writing this Article; Dean Robert Scott and Professors
Donna Adler, Richard Barnes, George Cochran, Carl Felsenfeld, Chris Frost, Saul
Levmore, Lynn LoPucki, Gary Myers, Sylvia Robertshaw, Ron Rychlak, Bryn Vaaler,
and Todd Zywicki for their helpful comments regarding this project in general and
this Article in particular; and Professors John Breen and Andrew Klein, longtime
friends, for their unwavering support. The Lamar Order of the University of Missis-
sippi School of Law provided financial support without which this Article would not
have been possible. Finally, I wish to thank the faculty and participants in the 1998
summer Austrian Economics Seminar, sponsored by the Austrian Economics Pro-
gram at New York University. Of course, all errors are my own. Comments and
questions are welcome at <johnmc@olemiss.edu>.
The title of this Article is derived from Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. and Mario J. Rizzo,
The Economics of Time and Ignorance (1985). As I shall explain below, the word
"uncertainty" is used in the sense of a lack of knowledge about facts that are too
diffuse and too numerous for any one person or even one institution to know, digest,
and synthesize.
1. See Peter J. Boettke, Introduction to The Elgar Companion to Austrian Eco-
nomics 1, 3-4 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994) [hereinafter Boettke, Introduction].
2. See Steven Horwitz, Subjectivism, in The Elgar Companion to Austrian Eco-
nomics, supra note 1, at 17, 17-18.
3. See id at 18.
4. See id at 17-18.
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could), all the bits of knowledge that are necessary to produce and to
exchange goods and services that suit the subjective tastes and desires
of consumers.5 When there is a gap in the market coordination of
knowledge, an opportunity exists to sell a good or service to consum-
ers at a better price than any other producer.6 Entrepreneurs discover
gaps in the market and seek to remedy them through action. The en-
trepreneur acts by formulating plans, testing those plans through a
process of rational criticism, and either implementing the original plan
or revising it further.7 Individual plans are sometimes coordinated
with the plans of others through social institutions such as corpora-
tions. The ameliorative role of entrepreneurship means that the mar-
ket itself is, unavoidably, a process that fosters the entrepreneurial
search for solutions to problems and, consequently, the general
growth of knowledge in society.'
The foregoing assertions are related to the bedrock assumptions of
traditional, neoclassical economics, but they are more cousins than
siblings. Indeed, the traditional law and economics scholarship of the
past few decades 9-with its emphasis on deriving from objective facts
the efficient solution to legal problems-has not mined the notions of
methodological individualism, subjectivism, and entrepreneurship in
any consistent fashion, despite the manifest relevance of these ideas
for those inclined to employ an economic approach to the study of
law.' 0
In that traditional vein, much ink has been spilled in an effort to
justify the American law of bankruptcy in general, and corporate reor-
ganizations in particular." Scholars have offered, from several per-
5. See id. at 19-20.
6. See Sanford Ikeda, Market Process, in The Elgar Companion to Austrian Eco-
nomics, supra note 1, at 23, 23-24.
7. See generally David A. Harper, Entrepreneurship and the Market Process: An
Enquiry into the Growth of Knowledge 3-44 (1996) (describing the market process as
an interpersonal learning process by which entrepreneurs identify gaps in knowledge,
formulate hypotheses for correcting the gap in knowledge, and revise their hypothe-
ses until the problem is solved).
8. See Israel M. Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Devel-
opment of Modem Austrian Economics 4-5 (1992) [hereinafter Kirzner, The Meaning
of Market Process].
9. For the best example of traditional law and economics developed in a system-
atic and comprehensive fashion, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(4th ed. 1992).
10. Law review articles that purport to apply these concepts to law are cited infra
note 29.
11. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986)
[hereinafter Jackson, Logic and Limits] (exploring the purposes of bankruptcy law
throughout its history); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell
L. Rev. 439 (1992) (arguing that bankruptcy law's reallocation and reorganization
provisions are dangerous and lack justification); Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical
Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1107 (1994) (main-
taining that bankruptcy law is misguided and its goals can be better accomplished
through contract law); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
[Vol. 672940
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Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and
Political Theories] (arguing that the American public's acceptance of bankruptcy law
is both a political and economic decision and offering alternative systems); Barry E.
Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 811 (1994) (positing that the aban-
donment of bankruptcy law would create a world without debt); Douglas G. Baird,
Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & Econ. 633 (1993) [hereinafter Baird, Revi-
siting Auctions] (examining the incentives of those in control of chapter 11 auctions
and the effect these incentives have on the costs of bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird,
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986) [herein-
after Baird, The Uneasy Case] (rejecting the accepted view that bankruptcy law
should change the rights that investors enjoy outside the bankruptcy arena); Douglas
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738 (1988) (describing the tensions underly-
ing the Bankruptcy Code utilizing caselaw); Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A
Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. Legal
Stud. 311 (1991) (explaining the dynamics of bargaining in bankruptcy); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775
(1988) (advocating a new method for dividing the reorganization "pie" among corpo-
rate partcipants); James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic
Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 Mich. L Rev. 1773 (1993) (exam-
ining recent scholars' attempts to analyze the utility of bankruptcy law); James W.
Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Banknptcy Theory
and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 Mich. L Rev. 2097 (1990) [hereinafter
Bowers, Groping and Coping] (asserting that the tendency of bankruptcy scholars to
tinker with current bankruptcy law is futile); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig,
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale LJ. 1043 (1992) (arguing that the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act hurts stockholders and bondholders of bankrupt firms);
Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial
Process, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 75 (1995) [hereinafter Frost, Redistributive Policies] (examin-
ing chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and its normative goals, which all call for a
redistributive bankruptcy policy); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Na-
ture of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75
Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989) (concluding that more attention should be given to the effects
of the rules of bankruptcy); Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor
and Creditor Interests, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1088 (1992) (arguing that chapter 11 in
reality does not enable reorganization); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values:
A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 717 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values] (challenging the economic analysis of bankruptcy and offering a
new account of bankruptcy law); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669 (1993) (discussing issues of corporate governance and for
whose benefit management should govern in bankruptcy situations); Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government. Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 993 (1995) (arguing that the government's role in creating the bank-
ruptcy system entitles it to use the system to further legitimate government interests);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,
71 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 55 (1992) (positing that amendments to corporate charters should
be constrained to reduce "the exportation of wealth from creditor to shareholder");
Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85, 85 (1995) (arguing that "poicymak-
ers in reforming the Bankruptcy Code should, where practicable, use the market to
inform the disposition of firms which encounter financial success"); Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Debt A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum. L
Rev. 527 (1983) (discussing the characteristics of a successful reorganization); Eliza-
beth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1987) [hereinafter Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy] (debating with Professor Baird the policies underlying business
bankruptcy law); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World,
1999] 2941
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spectives, expository models of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
("Code").' 2 Prominent among these efforts has been the work of a
group of scholars, led by Douglas Baird, Thomas Jackson, and Robert
Scott, who view the Code as embodying a hypothetical "creditors' bar-
gain" whose primary purpose, the orderly enforcement of creditor's
collection rights against the debtor, is vindicated through the Code.13
To such theorists, the cost and time delays of chapter 11 are difficult to
justify.' 4 Theorists in this tradition, labeled "free market critics" by at
least one commentator, 5 have labored brilliantly to devise market al-
ternatives to the chapter 11 process-ranging from auctions' 6 to reli-
ance on capital markets 7 -in an effort to reduce the wastefulness and
enhance the "efficiency" of corporate reorganizations. Even within
the "free market critics" camp, however, there is the forthright admis-
sion that the creditors' bargain model does not explain the endurance
of chapter 11 as an alternative to other creditor collection devices,
leading one commentator to conclude that chapter 11 must be "effi-
cient" or else it would not survive as a legal institution.'8
Other scholars, exemplified by Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth War-
ren, who are sometimes labeled "traditionalists," prefer to explain
chapter 11 as primarily a historical product embodying normative and
practical insights that have accreted over years of practical develop-
ment.'9 They view bankruptcy as "dirty, complex, elastic, [and] inter-
connected '20 and, therefore, reject the possibility of any "unified field
92 Mich. L. Rev. 336 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Imperfect World] (examining the
wide variety of goals within the bankruptcy system); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable
Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 Yale L.J. 437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, The
Untenable Case for Repeal] (criticizing the studies of Bradley and Rosenzweig);
Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 Wash. U.
L.Q. 1319 (1994) (analyzing bankruptcy law under a game theory model).
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
13. See Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 11, at 5; Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 815, 824 (1987); Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 127-29; Jackson &
Scott, supra note 11, at 155-58.
14. See Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 11, at 5 ("[T]he process of [con-
verting ownership of a firm in chapter 11] is costly. Bankruptcy law, at its core, is
concerned with reducing the costs of conversion.").
15. Donald R. Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates,
82 Iowa L. Rev. 75, 76 (1996).
16. See Baird, The Uneasy Case, supra note 11, at 136; see also Baird, Revisiting
Auctions, supra note 11, at 647-52 (discussing whether or not the early auction option
is appropriate in all circumstances).
17. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 11, at 323-33 (advocat-
ing the use of "chameleon equity" to be awarded to claimholders in an insolvent cor-
poration as a substitute for the chapter 11 process).
18. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. Fin. Econ.
411, 413 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 11, at 354-56 (discussing the
Code's benefits in protecting parties with no formal legal rights).
20. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 11, at 811.
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theory" of chapter 11.21 Rather, bankruptcy in general, and chapter
11 in particular, are, according to the traditionalists, the means by
which the losses from financial distress are allocated "among affected
parties according to particular goals, which include-but are not ex-
hausted by-economic efficiency. '
There are other, smaller groups of scholars who have applied differ-
ent philosophical constructs and analytical tools, from game theory'
to a solicitude for community interests,2 4 all in an effort to solve the
riddle of why chapter 11 looks the way it does or, indeed, why it exists
at all. To date, however, these attempts to explain chapter 11 have
failed to explain why, if it is devoid of normative content, society
should continue to support the chapter 11 process given its inherently
untidy process of negotiation and litigation.
These two broad approaches to chapter 11 suffer from one of two
distinct fallacies. The free marketers view the world, and human ac-
tion in particular, through the filter of simplifying assumptions that
result in abstracting too far from reality. Such critics propose reform
or repeal of chapter 11 based upon economic models that themselves
are the product of assumptions of perfect knowledge or of the nature
of markets that simply do not apply to real-world corporate insolven-
cies. 5 The resulting proposals-most of them quite clever and well
reasoned-have their greatest application in the theorist's simplified
world, rather than the world as it really exists.
On the other hand, the traditionalists seemingly throw their hands
up at the possibility of ever discerning an overarching principle to ex-
plain the structure of chapter 11, given the number of issues raised by
corporate insolvency. 6 In viewing the world in all of its complexity,
they despair of ever seeing the forest for the trees. Both approaches
have yielded scholarship of the highest order and quality, but one is
left feeling not entirely satisfied with either. This Article examines
chapter 11 through a different lens.
21. See id at 811-13.
22. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approad to Business Bankruptcy. 107 Yale
LJ. 1807, 1815 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 232-37 (1994)
(discussing bargaining and corporate reorganizations from a manager's perspective);
Daniel B. Bogart, Games Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy
and the Single Asset Loan Workout, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1117, 1178-93 (1996) (applying
game theory to borrower's decision to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy).
24. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bank-
ruptcy: An Essay, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1031, 1038-43 (1994) (advocating the application
of communitarian concepts to bankruptcy law).
25. See, eg., Roe, supra note 11, at 559-60 (proposing a corporate reorganization
method that depends on efficient market pricing of insolvent corporations).
26. See, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 11, at 777 ("1 see bankruptcy
as an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the conse-
quences among a number of different actors. Bankruptcy encompasses a number of
competing-and sometimes conflicting-values in this distribution.").
1999] 2943
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Corporate bankruptcy occurs in real time, to institutions made up of
human beings who are faced with radical, inescapable uncertainty
about the future. All agree that corporations are sometimes "worth"
more as a going concern than they would fetch if liquidated, and that
such companies are candidates for a corporate reorganization. 7
There is another economic approach that, taking heed of these in-
sights, provides a bridge between the free market and traditionalist
explanations for the structure, history, and durability of chapter 11. A
group of economists known as the "Austrian School"2  employ an
economic method2 9 that emphasizes the roles of uncertainty, en-
trepreneurial discovery, and subjectivism of economic value, largely in
contradistinction to the form of neoclassical economics that has
achieved primacy in economic thought over the last century.30
27. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for pro-
duction in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those
same assets sold for scrap.").
28. Throughout this Article, I will refer this group's economic thinking as "Aus-
trian," "Austrian School," or "Austrian economics." The label "Austrian" is applied
to this group in economics literature despite the fact that few of the modem "Austri-
ans" are actually natives of Austria. See Karen I. Vaughn, Austrian Economics in
America: The Migration of a Tradition 10 (1998) (noting that by the 1960s, the "Aus-
trian School" was dominated and centered in the United States). I provide a cursory
history of Austrian economics infra Part I.A.
29. It is fair to say that the Austrian economic approach, though not entirely ig-
nored in law and economics literature, is no more than a ripple in the pool of litera-
ture on neoclassical or Chicago School economic approaches to law. See Gregory
Scott Crespi, Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian Approach to the
Economic Analysis of Law, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 315, 339-69 (1998) (summarizing
the entire corpus of "law and Austrian economics" literature). For examples of "law
and Austrian economics" literature, see Roy E. Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Pas-
sage, and the Economics of Harmfid Effects, 12 Hamline L. Rev. 229 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Cordato, Subjective Value] (discussing efficiency and welfare economics); Roy E.
Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reassessing
The Coasean Perspective, 20 Campbell L. Rev. 273 (1998) [hereinafter Cordato, Time
Passage] (discussing the inappropriate analysis of "coming to the nuisance" under
traditional social cost-benefit analysid); Michael E. DeBow, Markets, Government In-
tervention, and the Role of Information: An "Austrian School" Perspective, with an
Application to Merger Regulation, 14 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 31 (1991) (analyzing
antitrust laws and merger guidelines); Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Econom-
ics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. Legal Stud. 291 (1980) (applying the
Austrian economic theory to the law of torts); Mario J. Rizzo, The Imputation Theory
of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1007 (1981) (same);
Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 641 (1980) (same); Mario
J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. Legal Stud. 281, 283-86
(1982) (same); Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process,
55 Ohio St. L.J. 1049 (1994) (modeling legal process using Austrian insights); Linda
A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate Between Critical Legal
Studies and Law and Economics, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 1105 (1992) (comparing Critical
Legal Studies and Law and Economics theory from an Austrian point of view); Chris-
topher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 Fordham
L. Rev. 507 (1986) (applying Austrian economic theory to the law of contracts).
30. This is not to say that the neoclassical and Austrian approaches are wholly
uncongenial to each other-quite the opposite is true. Rather, Austrian economics
1999] TIME, UNCERTAINTY, & CHAPTER 11 2945
In the Austrian theory of the firm (which is not yet fully articu-
lated), firms (and, indeed, all social institutions) are a response to a
lack of centralized knowledge on the part of the individuals who make
up the firm. The firm coordinates diffuse knowledge both through
planned, hierarchical structures and rules and through spontaneously
generated, interstitial rules and customs, best captured in the phrase
"corporate culture."' 31 A firm's structure and corporate culture are
directed to accomplishing the goal of the firm-entrepreneurial dis-
covery. This Article argues that Austrian economics applied to the
problem of corporate insolvency provides the explanation for the
structure of chapter 11 as it exists today. 2
Part I introduces the history and economic methodology of the Aus-
trian School. Part II describes the history and structure of the chapter
11 process. Part III suggests an "Austrian" model of chapter 11 which
draws evidence from its history and structure. Part IV explores the
implications of the approach outlined in part III to several current
issues in chapter 11.
I. A PRIMER ON AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
To Austrian economists, the individual is the basic unit of economic
analysis, a view shared by other economic traditions. 33 Austrians re-
ject schools of thought that depend upon explanations of economic
behavior or institutions divorced from human action and actors?"
Where Austrians part company from other "methodological individu-
supplements neoclassical economics by removing simplifying assumptions regarding
knowledge and time from the neoclassicist's model. The happy (to my mind) conse-
quence of the Austrian approach is the sacrifice of the mathematical precision gained
through (quite abstruse) modem econometrics for the ability to more fully prescribe
and predict the world as it exists.
31. See Nicolai J. Foss, The Austrian School and Modem Economics: Essays in
Reassessment, 174-75 & n.82 (1994) [hereinafter Foss, The Austrian School].
32. Professor Alan Schwartz has observed that the debate between the free mar-
keters and traditionalists is "characterized by an 'ought/is' mistake." Schwartz, supra
note 22, at 1814. That is, the free marketers insist that chapter 11 "ought" to be
efficient. "Traditionalists" agree, but respond that they also "want these systems to
protect the interests of persons or entities who do not hold current contract-based
claims against the insolvent firm." Id. at 1815. Professor Schwartz states that "the
appropriate response to an 'ought' claim is an 'ought not' claim, not an 'is' claim." Id.
at 1814-15. In this Article, I respond with an "ought not" claim: The central goal of
bankruptcy ought not be "efficiency," in the neoclassical sense, but rather preserving
and fostering the entrepreneurial process (in the Austrian economic sense) while si-
multaneously forestalling and preserving creditors' rights. Supporting this "ought
not" claim is the task I undertake in this Article.
33. The most prominent economic school which emphasizes methodological indi-
vidualism is the "Chicago School" of price theorists. See Peter J. Boettke & David L
Prychitko, The Future of Austrian Economics, in The Market Process: Essays in Con-
temporary Austrian Economics 287, 288 (Peter J. Boettke & David L Prychitko eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Boettke & Prychitko, The Future of Austrian Economics].
34. See id.
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alists"35 is in their emphasis on individuals acting according to their
subjective perceptions of a world characterized by the real passage of
time, ignorance of relevant knowledge, and genuine uncertainty re-
garding an indeterminate future. 6
A. History of the Austrian School
Austrian economics has its roots, as does neoclassical economics, in
the works of the French Physiocrats3 7 and British thinkers such as
David Hume, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith. 8 The modern "Aus-
trian School," however, springs directly from the work of Carl
Menger, his students Eugene B6hm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wie-
ser, and other economists in fin de sidcle Vienna. 9 The early Austrian
economists developed their ideas in response to classical political eco-
nomics,4" and to the dominant German "Historical School."'4' To the
historicists, "social phenomena can be understood only in their en-
tirety," and thus history is the empirical study of society from which
general social laws can be deduced.42
35. For a comparison of the methodological individualism of the "Chicago
School" and the Austrians, see Karl-Heinz Paqu6, How Far is Vienna from Chicago?
An Essay on the Methodology of Two Schools of Dogmatic Liberalism, 38 Kyklos 412
(1985).
36. See Boettke & Prychitko, The Future of Austrian Economics, supra note 33, at
288.
37. See Ludwig von Mises, Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics
(1929), reprinted in Austrian Economics: An Anthology, 47, 47-49 (Bettina Bien
Greaves ed., 1996); Ludwig von Mises, The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of
Economics (1969), reprinted in Austrian Economics: An Anthology, supra, at 53, 57
[hereinafter Mises, The Historical Setting].
38. See Mises, The Historical Setting, supra note 37, at 60.
39. See G. R. Steele, The Economics of Friedrich Hayek 9 (1993). This is not to
say that the precepts which undergird Austrian economics sprang wholecloth from
Enlightenment or post-Enlightenment sources. Scholars have noted proto-Austrian
themes in the works of late scholastic writers, particularly in Spain in the sixteenth
century, and in Aristotle's approach to the methodology of science. See Alejandro A.
Chafuen, The Late Scholastics, in The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics,
supra note 1, at 487; Barry Smith, Aristotelianism, Apriorism, Essentialism, in The
Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics, supra note 333, at 33.
40. See Boettke, Introduction, supra note 333, at 1.
41. See Samuel Bostaph, The Methodenstreit, in The Elgar Companion to Austrian
Economics, supra note 333, at 459-64; Mises, The Historical Setting, supra note 37, at
60.
42. Steele, supra note 39, at 9. The Historical School was prevalent in mid-eight-
eenth century Germany and is associated with Gustav Schmoller. See id. The empiri-
cism of the Historical School rejected the usefulness of logical deduction and
therefore saw little utility in a focus on economics as opposed to history. See id. at 9-
10. Ludwig von Mises has stated that the Historical School, through its embrace of
state socialism as a result of its historical approach to social sciences, made "Germany
safe for the ideas" which led to "aggressive imperialism .... limitless inflation of the
early 1920s, the [command economy] and all the horrors of the Nazi regime ... "
Mises, The Historical Setting, supra note 37, at 67.
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Menger's works43 emphasized the importance of individual deci-
sionmaking4 to the study of economics, and distinguished himself
from other "marginalists" through his assertion that mathematical
modeling was simply insufficient to explain economic phenomena.45
Proponents of the Historical School greeted Menger's books with ridi-
cule, and labeled them pejoratively46 as "Austrian.""7
Menger's disciples continued this tradition with work solidly in the
economic mainstream in fields such as monetary theory and choice
theory, but with a Mengerian methodological twist." Early Austrian
economics was marked from the beginning by a distinct lack of mathe-
matical analysis, recognition of the subjectivism inherent in questions
of economic value,4 9 and an emphasis on the dynamic nature of mar-
kets and economic interactions.50
Through the work of the two giants of twentieth century Austrian
economics, Ludwig von Mises5 ' and Friedrich Hayek,52 the Austrian
43. See Carl Menger, Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with
Special Reference to Economics (1883) (Louis Schneider ed. & Francis J. Nock trans.,
1985); Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (1871) (James Dingwald & Bert F.
Hoselitz eds. and trans., 1950).
44. This aspect of his work has earned Menger a place beside Leon Walras and
William Stanley Jevons as the one of the co-founders of the Marginalist Revolution,
which, in turn, is the basis for modern neoclassical economics. See Kirzncr, The Mean-
ing of Market Process, supra note 8, at 58.
45. Professor Israel Kirzner of New York University, the dean of the Austrian
school, states that:
The central thrust of Menger's book [Principles of Economics] was unmis-
takable; it was an attempt to rebuild the foundations of economic science in
a way which, while retaining the abstract, theoretical character of economics,
offered an understanding of value and price which ran sharply counter to
classical teachings. For the classical economists value was seen as governed
by past resource costs; Menger saw value as expressing judgements concern-
ing future usefulness in meeting consumer wants.
Id.
46. See Mises, The Historical Setting, supra note 37, at 56.
Even if no political and nationalistic prepossessions had disturbed their judg-
ment, they could not help becoming somewhat suspicious of a line of
thought which the professors of the universities of the German Reich
dubbed specifically Austrian. Never before had any new mode of thinking
originated in Austria .... For people who were not familiar with economics,
the predicate "Austrian" as applied to a doctrine carried strong overtones of
the dark days of the counter-reformation and of Metternich. To an Austrian
intellectual, nothing could appear more disastrous than a relapse of his coun-
try into the spiritual inanity of the good old days.
Id.
47. Steele, supra note 39, at 10.
48. See Boettke, Introduction, supra note 1, at 1-2.
49. The early Austrians held that the value of a good "is ubjectively determined
upon the basis of an individual's wants and his knowledge of circumstances and op-
portunities. Utility [is] not inherent in particular objects, but in the relationships be-
tween objects and individuals ...." Steele, supra note 39, at 10.
50. See Boettke, Introduction, supra note 1, at 2.
51. Ludwig von Mises was born in 1881 in the city of Lemberg in the Austro-
Hungarian empire (now L'vov, Ukraine). See Eamonn Butler, Ludwig von Mises:
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Fountainhead of the Modem Microeconomics Revolution 7 (1988). He studied at the
University of Vienna where he received a doctorate in law and economics. See id. at 8.
His reading of Menger, who was then near the end of his career at the University,
influenced his decision to become an economist. See id. Through a long career as a
civil servant, scholar, and professor, first in Vienna, then Switzerland, and eventually
the United States, Mises was a prolific writer and popular teacher. See id. at 8-11. In
his magnum opus, Human Action, he sought to develop the notion of a "science... of
human action," of which economics was only a part. Ludwig von Mises, Human Ac-
tion: A Treatise on Economics 2 (1949) [hereinafter Mises, Human Action]. Mises
believed that the nature of human action could be deduced from simple axioms re-
garding people's behavior and that the influence of "time, uncertainty, and specula-
tion in economic actions," were factors largely ignored in mainstream, mathematical
models based upon simplifying assumptions. Butler, supra, at 16. Mises died in 1973,
"the undisputed doyen of the Austrian School of economics." Id. at 11. Mises works
remain influential today. His works include: Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological
Problems of Economics (1933) (George Reisman trans., 1960) (exploring the errors
implied in the doctrines that reject economic theory); Ludwig von Mises, Nation,
State, and Economy (1919) (Leland B. Yeager trans., 1983) (pointing to historical
factors in the development of a nation's economics); Ludwig von Mises, Socialism:
An Economic and Sociological Analysis (1922) (J. Kahane trans., 1951) (examining
the problems of the socialist construction of society with the aid of sociological and
economic theory); Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (1912) (H.E.
Batson trans., 1935) (discussing the economic theory underpinning money and credit).
52. Friedrich August von Hayek was born in Vienna in 1899. See Steele, supra
note 39, at 3. He received a law degree from the University of Vienna in 1921, despite
having spent most of his time reading psychology and economics. See id. He came
under the influence of Ludwig von Mises at the University, and worked for him after
graduation. See id. at 3-4. During his long life, Hayek lived and worked in the United
States, Austria, Germany, and Great Britain (he became a citizen of Great Britain in
1938). See id. at 4-5. Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. See
id. at 5. President Bush awarded him the Medal of Freedom in 1991, shortly before
Professor Hayek died in 1992. See Sylvia Nasar, Friedrich von Hayek Dies at 92; An
Early Free-Market Economist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1992, at D22. One commentator
sums up Hayek's work as having come "closest to a genuine praxeology, a term...
which denotes a unified theory of human action." Steele, supra note 39, at 5. Hayek
made intellectual contributions in "economics, epistemology, ethics, law, philosophy,
politics and psychology." Id. He believed that "institutions of human society are
shaped not by the application of rational intellectual design, but through a natural and
spontaneous evolution." Id. Hayek was an extremely prolific writer. His works in-
clude: Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) [hereinafter Hayek,
Constitution] (stating the criteria by which particular measures must be judged in
order to fit into a regime of freedom); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution
of Science (1952) [hereinafter Hayek, Counter-Revolution] (discussing general issues
of the study of society and the counter-revolution of science); Friedrich A. Hayek,
The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988) (examining
the development of the differing moralities of socialism and market order); Friedrich
A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (1948) [hereinafter Hayek, Individual-
ism] (containing a varity of essays that range from discussions of moral philosophy to
problems of economic theory and policy); Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and
Liberty: The Political Order of a Free People (1979) (describing various means for
both avoiding a totalitarian regime and preserving a "democratic" form of govern-
ment); Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Jus-
tice (1976) (arguing that the scholarly concept of "social justice" does not exist);
Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty] (discussing a transformation of liberal dem-
ocratic institutions into totalitarian systems); Friedrich A. Hayek, New Studies in
Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas (1978) [hereinafter Hayek,
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school diverged, though never completely, from neoclassical econom-
ics.53 Beginning in the 1920s and continuing for several decades, first
Mises and then Hayek applied their prodigious energies to unveiling
the fallacies behind centralized planning, which so thoroughly cap-
tured the imaginations of intellectuals in this century.' 4 The debate
over the viability of socialism revealed the previously obscured fault
lines between neoclassical economics and the Austrian School.5' The
Austrians perceived that neoclassical economics, with its emphasis on
static equilibrium states, ignored the role of discovery, innovation, dif-
fusion of knowledge, and the passage of time.56 Austrian writings re-
peatedly emphasized the critical insight that real markets are dynamic,
and thus, a detailed study of market processes was more fruitful than
mathematical models based upon unrealistic simplifying assumptions
and generalizations.57
From the 1940s through the 1970s, Austrian economics fell into de-
cline, and many of its sympathizers worked within the neoclassical
mainstream supplementing their work with Austrian insights.58 As
many academic economists embraced socialism during those years,
Mises and Hayek fled continental Europe for the United States and
England, respectively, and were left to tend the flame of Austrian
New Studies] (containing a collection of essays dealing with problems of philosophy,
politics, and economics); Friedrich A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Eco-
nomics (1967) (same); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944) [hereinafter
Hayek, Road to Serfdom] (discussing flaws in socialist attitudes toward political sys-
tems); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of
Theoretical Psychology (1952) (using accepted psychological assumptions to explain
the central problem of the nature of mental phenomena); Friedrich A. Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, in Hayek, Individualism, supra, at 77 [hereinafter
Hayek, Use of Knowledge] (discussing the problems that ought to be solved by a ra-
tional economic order). For a complete bibliography of Hayek's works through 1976,
see Fritz Machlup, Hayek's Contribution to Economics, in Essays on Hayek 13, 51-59
(Fritz Machiup ed., 1976).
53. Other "Austrian" economists who have made significant contributions in this
century include Israel Kirzner, Murray Rothbard, and Ludwig Lachman. See Boettke,
Introduction, supra note 1, at 2-3. Twentieth century economists who would not nec-
essarily identify themselves as "Austrians" but nevertheless were influenced by Aus-
trian economic methodology include Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar
Morgenstern, Lionel Robbins, Joseph Schumpeter, and others. See id. at 2.
54. See Vaughn, supra note 28, at 7.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 8. Professor Vaughn cites Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar
Morgenstern, and Joseph Schumpeter as prominent Austrian economists who emi-
grated from Austria during the 1920s and 1930s and "carried on inquiry into Austrian
themes using accepted neoclassical language and techniques." Id. Mises and, perhaps,
Hayek did not "assimilate" into the neoclassical mainstream and thus "existed on the
sidelines of academia, marking time and despairing for the future" because of the
"perceived triumph" of socialism and the concomitant failure of its Austrian critique.
Id
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ideas, though in what one commentator labels "despair" in their
"diaspora."5 9
Though glimmers of a renaissance of Austrian economics were ap-
parent from the early 1960s,6° it was not until the 1970s61 that Austrian
economics began its true resurgence. Hayek won the Nobel Prize for
economics in 1974, an event that set the stage for the Austrian revi-
val.6" The subsequent work of Austrian economists, such as Israel
Kirzner63 on entrepreneurship and Ludwig Lachmann 6 on institu-
59. See id. "The real problem [during this time period was] ... that Mises and
Hayek were closely wedded to a certain methodological tradition in economics, an
anti-positivism that was completely rejected by the 1950s. Their work simply ap-
peared anachronistic to the majority of economists, who preached positivism and for-
mal modelling." Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko, Introduction: The Present
Status of Austrian Economics: Some (Perhaps Biased) Institutional History Behind
Market Process Theory, in The Market Process: Essays in Contemporary Austrian
Economics 1, 4 (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds., 1994) [hereinafter
Boettke & Prychitko, Introduction].
60. Boettke & Prychitko, Introduction, supra note 59, at 7.
61. Some commentators date the "Austrian revival" to a conference in 1974 in
South Royalton, Vermont, sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies. See
Vaughn, supra note 28, at 104. United by their interest in Hayek and Mises, the par-
ticipants included such important modem Austrian economists as Israel Kirzner, Lud-
wig Lachman, and Murray Rothbard. See id. at 104-05. Milton Friedman attended the
conference and caused a stir by stating that "there is no such thing as Austrian eco-
nomics-only good economics, and bad economics." Id. at 105.
62. See id. at 104.
63. See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973) [herein-
after Kirzner, Competition] (criticizing contemporary price theory from an Austrian
perspective); Israel M. Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Kirzner, Discovery] (expressing a "positive vision of capitalism-absorbed from
the 'Austrian' tradition"); Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at ix
(reaffirming "the basic, century old Austrian perspective upon the market process");
Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An
Austrian Approach, 35 J. Econ. Lit. 60, 78-82 (1997) [hereinafter Kirzner, En-
trepreneurial Discovery] (describing the views of two groups of modem Austrian
economists who oppose the entrepreneurial discovery approach); Israel M. Kirzner,
On The Economics of Time and Ignorance, in The Market Process: Essays in Con-
temporary Austrian Economics 38 (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds., 1994)
(reviewing O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68) [hereinafter Kirzner, On The Econom-
ics of Time and Ignorance] (arguing that Austrian economics should elaborate to what
extent systematic economic processes can be understood-despite genuine
uncertainty).
64. See, e.g., Ludwig M. Lachmann, Capital and its Structure (2nd ed. 1978) (dis-
cussing the theory of capital in Austrian Economics); Ludwig M. Lachmann, Capital,
Expectations, and the Market Process: Essays on the Theory of the Market Economy
(1977) (discussing economic phenomena from a radical subjectivist paradigm); Lud-
wig M. Lachmann, Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Econom-
ics by Ludwig Lachmann (D. Lavoie ed., 1994) [hereinafter Lachmann, Expectations
and Institutions] (compliling Lachmann's works addressing key topics on micro and
macro economics, methodology, and the history of thought); Ludwig M. Lachmann,
The Legacy of Max Weber: Three Essays (1971) [hereinafter Lachmann, The Legacy
of Max Weber] (reassessing some of Weber's lesser known contributions); Ludwig M.
Lachmann, The Market as an Economic Process (1986) [hereinafter Lachmann, Eco-
nomic Process] (discussing market processes from the perspective of Austrian eco-
nomics); Ludwig M. Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian
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tions, attracted enough interest to lead to the establishment of Ph.D.
programs in Austrian economics at New York University and George
Mason University, a Ludwig von Mises Institute at Auburn Univer-
sity, and numerous course offerings in Austrian economics in colleges
and universities throughout the United States.' Interest in Austrian
economic analysis66 today is burgeoning, leading one legal scholar op-
timistically to predict "a Kuhnian revolution in economic theory
where the Austrian approach will henceforth share equal billing with
the neoclassical paradigm" both in economic analysis and its applica-
tion to law.67
With such a long and varied historical pedigree, it is not surprising
that Austrian economists are not homogenous in thought or method.
They do, however, share certain principles that distinguish them from
the adherents of other economic methodologies, beginning with their
view of the role of time and uncertainty in economics.
B. Real Time and Uncertainty
Perhaps the most significant difference between neoclassical eco-
nomic models and those of the Austrian School is their respective
treatment of time 68 and the consequences of its passage. Neoclassical
models view time as another resource to be allocated, just as land may
Economics and the Kaleidic Society, 14 J. Econ. Lit. 54 (1976) [hereinafter Lachmann,
Kaleidic Society] (discussing the contributions of two prominent Austrian econo-
mists); Ludwig M. Lachmann, An Austrian Stocktaking: Unsettled Questions and Ten-
tative Answers, in New Directions in Austrian Economics 1, 1-18 (Louis M. Spadaro
ed., 1978) (evaluating contemporary developments in economics and distinguishing
the knowable past from the unknowable future).
65. See Crespi, supra note 29, at 321 n.29.
66. Professor Israel Kirzner has identified several different understandings of the
term "Austrian School" which are current, at least in the economics profession, today.(1) Purely Historical-the followers of Menger and their work has been partially ab-
sorbed and partially eclipsed by modem neoclassical economics; (2) Limited to Capi-
tal and Interest Theory-the Austrian School in this area is associated with the work
of B6hm-Bawerk in the field, and has little reference to Mengerian subjectivism; (3)
Libertarian Politics-due largely to the work of Murray Rothbard in political philoso-
phy, many economists conflate Austrian economics with a libertarian political philos-
ophy; (4) Menger, Mises, and Hayek-to still other economists, the Austrian School
represents a revival of interest in the work of the three titans of Austrian economics,
including the ideas described in this paper, (5) Emphasis on Radical Uncertainty-a
subset of (4), some economists associate the Austrian School with the radical subjec-
tivity and emphasis on uncertainty in the work of, among others, Ludwig Lachmann.
See Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 66-69. 1 hereinafter use
the term "Austrian School" in the sense of (4) and, to some extent, (5).
67. Crespi, supra note 29, at 322 (footnote omitted) (citing Thomas Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolution (3d ed. 1970)).
68. Professor Gerard P. O'Driscoll, Jr. and Mario J. Rizzo are, to my knowledge,
the economists that have most fully explored the differences between the Austrian
view of time-which they call "real time"-and the neoclassical conception-which
they term static or "Newtonian" time. See Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. & Mario J. Rizzo,
The Economics of Time and Ignorance 52-70 (1985).
1999] 2951
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
be allocated among different uses.69 They derive outcomes purely
from initial conditions, thus rendering time empty of independent
content. 70 Neoclassical economics must deny any independent signifi-
cance to time's passage because each point in time lacks any specific
content.71 Thus, time is analogous to a line in geometry-each point
represents merely a position in space, but is devoid of any content
beyond its position.72 Taking the neoclassical view of time seriously
means that "time can elapse without anything happening. '73 As a re-
sult, neoclassical economists have no trouble reconciling their static
concept of time with economic models that assume perfect predictabil-
ity in human affairs.74
Austrian economists do not accept the neoclassical view.75 The
Austrian concept of "real" or "subjective" time recognizes a "dy-
namic" conception of time.76 Real time is linked to both the past, in
the form of memory, and to the future, in the form of expectation.77
Real time is irreversible in the sense that once the present becomes
the past it cannot be revisited. An individual changes from one mo-
ment to another because with each moment the individual gains expe-
rience that changes him from who he was a moment ago. As the
individual gains experience through time, his subjective perceptions of
the world and plans for the future change as well. The revision of
perceptions and plans through past memory and experience leads to
increased knowledge of the world in the present.78
69. See id. at 2-3.
70. See Vaughn, supra note 28, at 135.
71. See O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at 54.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 3.
75. See id. at 1-4.
76. See id. at 2.
77. O'Driscoll and Rizzo illustrate their concept of time with the example of how
we experience a melody:
Hearing only one note of a melody, for example, is insufficient to capture
the experience of music. This is because our perception involves memory of
the just-elapsed phases (or notes) and anticipation of those yet to come. The
actual experience is thus more than a mathematical instant; it is impossible
to subdivide continuously a piece of music without fundamentally altering or
negating the experience. The dynamic structure of real time consists, then,
of two aspects: memory and expectation. On this view, the present is in prin-
ciple linked with other periods through the perceptions of the individual....
Real time thus implies the very linkages from which Newtonian time
abstracts.
Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
78. O'Driscoll and Rizzo state:
[A]II economic processes must involve the transmission and growth of
knowledge.... [C]ompetition is no longer merely the name given to a cer-
tain equilibrium state. Instead .... the process of competition is literally a
discovery procedure. The growth of knowledge is the endogenous force that
endlessly propels the system.
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Learning, in the sense of acquiring new knowledge, is thus a dy-
namic and inevitable result of the passage of real time. If learning is a
consequence of real time, then the future cannot be determined
mechanically-it is open-ended, indeterminate. An indeterminate fu-
ture means that uncertainty is inherent and insuperable; humans con-
stantly face genuine uncertainty regarding the future,79 and this
uncertainty inheres in a world of real time.' The acting person can-
not predict his own future knowledge,1 nor can one economic actor
perfectly coordinate his plans with those of another. This insight has
profound implications for the study of the market. "[T]he emergence
of new ideas in business-new products, new technologies . . .and
new ventures-can never be anticipated precisely in advance .... If
entrepreneurs could predict their future discoveries, they would be-
come present discoveries, and the growth of their knowledge would
thus come to an end."8" Uncertainty about the future and about the
plans of others means that inevitably individuals often will be mis-
taken when they act. Imperfect knowledge about the world means,
inevitably, that people will err.' 3
Id. at 62; see also Mario J. Rizzo, Tune in Economics, in The Elgar Companion to
Austrian Economics, supra note 1, at 111, 111-17 (setting out an Austrian approach to
real time and specifically tying it to the work of continental philosophers Henri Berg-
son and Edmund Husserl). The foregoing discussion is drawn generally from
O'Driscoll and Rizzo's detailed treatment of time in The Economics of Time and Ig-
norance, which, in turn, is consistent with a long tradition in Austrian economics. See,
e.g., Kirzner, Discovery, supra note 63, at 40-67 (discussing "uncertainty, discovery
and human action" in the economics of Ludwig von Mises); Mises, Human Action,
supra note 51, at 254 ("[Elvery [human] action is embedded in the flux of time and
therefore involves a speculation.").
79. O'Driscoll and Rizzo state:
A world in which there is autonomous or creative decision-making is one in
which the future is not merely unknown, but unknowable. There is nothing
in the present state of the world that enables us to predict the future state
because the latter is underdetermined by the former. (This, of course, does
not preclude the analyst from, ex post, making the once-future intelligible on
the basis of what happened in the past.) Subjectivism and action under un-
certainty are thus inseparable ideas.
O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at 2.
80. See id. at 66-67.
81. See Harper, supra note 7, at 108-09.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Professor Cordato summarizes the importance of the notion of real time as
follows:
The essence of time passage is change; change in preferences, change in
technology, change in population, etc. The significance of these changes for
economics is that they are either the product of, or they lead to, changes in
human knowledge. Furthermore, the process by which knowledge changes
is an imperfect one of trial and error, which itself, is time dependent. By
implication, then, at any point in time some actions will be taken that are
based on erroneous information. In other words, people will make plans
that are inconsistent with the goals that they are pursuing. In a market set-
ting, such actions are penalized with losses. These losses provide incentives
to discard erroneous information and reassess and redesign plans in hopes
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C. Subjectivism
Another pillar in the thought of Austrian economists from Menger
to the present is a belief in "dynamic subjectivism."'  The purpose of
social sciences is to account for the "unintended and unforeseen pat-
terns of results that evolve from ... human interactions."85 Econo-
mists must seek to understand the subjective meaning that human
beings attach to their actions in the world and the things around
them, 6 taking into account the incomplete, subjective knowledge and
perceptions of human actors in any given situation. Subjectivists posit
that human action is not determined solely by external facts.87 There
is room within the study of human action for individual creativity and
choice founded upon subjective perceptions, beliefs, and knowledge.88
Neoclassical mathematical models, on the other hand, recognize the
subjectivity of human preferences, but nothing else, thus reducing eco-
nomics to the study of "constrained [utility] maximization."89 Such an
exercise is bound to fail wholly or in part as a model with expository
power for the real world of human action. Neoclassical economic
"[a]gents do not make real choices, they exercise no imagination and
their maxima are simply functional implications of objective data." 90
that future activity will be based on accurate information and be rewarded
by profits. This is an ongoing process of plan formulation and revision in
light of new information. Knowledge is never perfected. As problems are
fixed new ones are revealed by the continuous generation and flow of new
information.
Cordato, Time Passage, supra note 29, at 277.
84. "The essential premise of dynamic subjectivism is that decisions are not the
determinate result of clearly specifiable causes." O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at
24 (citation omitted).
85. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 17.
86. See id. (quoting Hayek, Counter-Revolution, supra note 52, at 44, 53) ("So far
as human actions are concerned the things are what the acting people think they are
... [and] unless we can understand what the acting people mean by their actions any
attempt to explain them ... is bound to fail.").
87. See O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at 1.
88. See id.
89. Vaughn, supra note 28, at 134; see O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at 22-23.
90. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 20. Professor Harper states that:
Neoclassical maximisers do not face genuine problems, because the situa-
tions that they encounter exclude all elements of surprise and novelty. Even
in game theory, a decision is specified for every imaginable situation: genu-
ine surprises in the course of the game are excluded. Economic actors in
neoclassical theory do not face problems in deciding what to do (i.e. the
choice of ends) and how to do it (i.e. the choice of means). They are able to
react to their situations instantaneously, and their responses are in general
immune from the hazards of error. . . . The rationality postulate (in the
narrow sense of consistency of the agent's behaviour with the relevant given
ranking of ends) is sufficient to explain pure economising activity. Neither
entrepreneurial alertness nor imagination is required.
Learning in the usual neoclassical analysis is a universal process that
is exogenously given and thus unexplained . .. ."
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Using such a model, economic decision-making essentially becomes a
classical physics9' problem. Given certain objectively defined initial
conditions, such as full relevant knowledge on the part of all actors
and zero transaction costs, human choice is reduced to a mathematical
equation from which the economist can derive the "resulting equilib-
rium outcome for each actor and for the market as a whole."'
In contrast, Austrian economists in the tradition of Ludwig von
Mises approach economics as the study of subjective human action
that
is a far broader concept than that of [neoclassical] economising;
while the allocation of scarce means among multiple competing
ends may be an example of human action, human action need not be
allocative at all. "Human action is purposeful behavior." What act-
ing man seeks to do is "to substitute a more satisfactory state of
affairs for a less satisfactory." Nothing in these formulations con-
fines them to the calculative allocation of scarce means with respect
to competing goals.
... The essential element in action is goal pursuit, not maximiza-
tion, not allocative efficiency, or anything else.... Subjectivism in
the analysis of Misesian human action includes the insight that any
ends-means framework relevant to a human action has itself been
actively chosen in the course of that very action-and that that
choice expresses and reflects that agent's dreams, aspirations and
imagination, his expectations and his knowledge, his hunches and
his biases. 3
The implication of the Misesian view is that any model of economic
actors as mechanistic allocators of economic resources is too
simplistic.94
Harper, supra note 7, at 84-85 (quoting L.A. Boland, Methodology for a New
Microeconomics: The Critical Foundations 157 (1986)).
91. "'FN]eoclassical economics[ I' has in the past often been praised and damned
by being held up to the standards of physics .... [Tihe progenitors of neoclassical
economic theory boldly copied the reigning physical theories [of] the 1870s ... mostly
term for term and symbol for symbol, and said so." Philip Mirowski, More Heat than
Light: Economics as a Social Physics: Physics as Nature's Economics 3 (1989).
92. Crespi, supra note 29, at 326.
93. Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 130-31 (citations
omitted) (quoting Mises, Human Action, supra note 51, at 11, 13).
94. Mises stated that an economist interested in a theory of human action more
meaningful than a mathematical construct such as the equilibrium reached if all "fur-
ther changes in data were to cease," will
show[ ] how the activities of enterprising men, the promoters and specula-
tors, eager to profit from discrepancies in the price structure, tend toward
eradicating such discrepancies and thereby also toward blotting out the
sources of entrepreneurial profit and loss. He shows how this process would
finally result in the establishment of the evenly rotating economy. This is the
task of economic theory. The mathematical description of various states of
equilibrium is mere play. The problem is the analysis of the market process.
Mises, Human Action, supra note 51, at 352-53. It should be noted that Mises's view
that the market process would tend toward an "evenly rotating economy," id. at 245,
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Building upon Mises's work, Friedrich von Hayek stressed the role
of knowledge in the market. Hayek is famous for stating:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated
or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individu-
als possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a
problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to
mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem
set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best
use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends
whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put
it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not
given to anyone in its totality.95
The myriad and profound implications9 6 of Hayek's subjectivist fram-
ing of the "economic problem" include the recognition that the mar-
ket is a dynamic process geared to learning, and that the role of social
institutions is to aid in coordinating dispersed knowledge. 7 These
themes are explored below.
D. Entrepreneurship and the Market Process
Austrians define ignorance as the "utter unawareness of some as-
pect of the world germane to choice." 98 If the actor becomes aware of
the facts of which he was previously ignorant, it cannot be through a
conscious choice on his part, or else he would truly not have been
ignorant of the fact, but rather simply blind to the benefits of informa-
tion of which he was already aware. 99 Hayek's insight that knowledge
is diffused widely among individuals in a society means that no one
person or institution is or could be the repository of all knowledge.
Individuals in the market (and economists at their desks) must come
to grips with this inevitable ignorance of economic actors.
An individual's response to the twin realities of genuine uncertainty
regarding the future and his own ignorance of beneficial knowledge is
is not uncontroversial among Austrian economists, some of whom reject the notion
that there is any point toward which the economy naturally tends. See Kirzner, En-
trepreneurial Discovery, supra note 63, at 79-82.
95. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 52, at 77-78.
96. Professor Israel Kirzner opines that "Hayek's insights ... pointed to a compre-
hensive fully ... subjectivist revolution of understanding in [microeconomics and wel-
fare economics]. That these threatened revolutions somehow never succeeded in
dislodging the neoclassical dominance is mute evidence of the very limited extent to
which the modern profession has been hospitable to extensions of subjectivism."
Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 133.
97. See id.
98. Ikeda, supra note 6, at 23. The alternative form of ignorance, of course, is
willful ignorance of germane knowledge of which the actor is aware. See id.
99. See id.
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action. In the context of economic decisions, Austrians stress that in-
dividuals act entrepreneurially;100 i.e., they are alert to opportunities
previously overlooked due to their own or others' ignorance."' En-
trepreneurs notice, exploit, and eventually correct gaps in the market.
The entrepreneur is the key, therefore, to an understanding of the
market process and its fruits-innovation and growth of knowledge in
society.
Neoclassical economists, on the other hand, emphasize an individ-
ual's selection of a course of action with respect to a given means by
maximization of his "utility.""0 2 The neoclassical market, in turn, is
the result of the individual decisions of myriad "economizing individu-
als, each making his decisions with respect to given series of ends and
means."103 The neoclassical economic person has all relevant knowl-
edge concerning the world around him, and a defined means-ends
framework. Solving for the optimum result, given that all potential
variables are defined by the assumptions, is trivial. It is no wonder
that neoclassical economic models have difficulty accounting for the
existence and role of entrepreneurs in the market.
Austrian economists reject such determinism in favor of a system
that does not constrain the entrepreneur to calculating maximum out-
comes within a given ends-means framework. The Austrian entrepre-
neur acts within the ends-means framework perceived by her, given
her uncertainty about the future and her ignorance of at least some
potentially relevant knowledge. To complicate matters further, as the
entrepreneur makes decisions, alertness to the possibility of new ends
and means worth pursuing leads to revision of her plans as well." m It
100. Mises defines the entrepreneur as an "acting [person] exclusively seen from
the aspect of the uncertainty inherent in every action. In using this term, one must
never forget that every action is embedded in the flux of time and therefore involves a
speculation .... There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip." Mises, Human Action, supra
note 51, at 254.
101. This view of an entrepreneur as alert to previously overlooked opportunities
has its roots in the work of Ludwig von Mises. See id. The most prominent Austrian
commentator on the theory of entrepreneurship is Professor Israel M. Kirzner of New
York University. See, e.g., Kirzner, Competition, supra note 63, at 1 (developing an
unorthodox theory of the market and price system); Kirzner, Discovery, supra note
63, at ix (discussing some normative and policy implications of a differing vision of
capitalism); Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at ix (arguing that
mainstream economic conclusions must be defended by introducing subjectivist Aus-
trian economic insights); Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery, supra note 63, at 60 (set-
ting forth a differing approach on microeconomic theory within Austrian economics).
The Austrian entrepreneur should not be confused with the neoclassical one. As Pro-
fessor Kirzner states: "In standard neoclassical equilibrium theory there is, by its very
character, no role for the entrepreneur. In equilibrium [theory] ... there is simply
nothing for the entrepreneur to do." Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery, supra note
63, at 69.
102. See Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science 137 (1932).
103. Kirzner, Competition, supra note 63, at 33.
104. See iL at 36-37.
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is important to stress, however, that the Austrian entrepreneur does
not act in a purely chaotic world of unlimited choice. Although the
entrepreneur acts within her own subjective judgment concerning the
universe of possibilities available, those subjective possibilities are al-
ways "bounded" by the entrepreneur's rational judgment' 0 5 concern-
ing the "constraints that limit the ways in which market events can
follow each other.' ' 0 6
Moreover, entrepreneurs act in a dynamic world where tomorrow
will be different from today. As consumer tastes change and as new
opportunities are exploited, new entrepreneurial opportunities will
arise, which will be noticed by an alert individual who will exploit
them ad infinitum. "This ongoing social 'learning' process, and the
continual revealing and pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities, is re-
garded by Austrians as the central dynamic force underlying the
evolution of not only markets, but also of all other social
institutions."10 7
Austrians led by Professor Israel Kirzner believe, therefore, that the
market is a process that "provide[s] a systemic set of forces, set in
motion by entrepreneurial alertness, which tend to reduce the extent
of mutual ignorance. Knowledge is not perfect; but neither is igno-
rance necessarily invincible.' 1 8 This vision of the entrepreneur led
Professor Kirzner to conclude that the Austrian view of the market
represents a "middle ground" between the polar extremes of neoclas-
sical economics, with its assumptions of perfect knowledge on the part
of market actors, and radical subjectivists, who utterly deny the rele-
vance of models concerning market equilibration. Kirzner's view,
"developed from Misesian insights ... finds entrepreneurship incom-
patible with the equilibrium state, but compatible with, and indeed es-
sential for, the notion of the equilibration process."'' 9 Thus, the
market never is, and can never be, in a neoclassical equilibrium state;
however, the market process provides the context and incentive for
105. Professor Kirzner writes that:
The world is indeed constantly changing in unpredictable ways. People die,
babies are born, tastes change spontaneously. Resource availabilities change
over time; technological knowledge may evolve autonomously. But, it
would be insisted, the rapidity and unpredictability of these changes is not,
in general, so extreme as to frustrate the emergence of powerful and perva-
sive economic regularities. It is because these changes are frequent enough
to ensure perennial disequilibrium that we need to understand the nature of
equilibrating forces. It is because of the possibility, at least, of a benign limit
to the volatility of these changes that these equilibrating forces do, at least
sometimes, manifest themselves as unmistakable economic regularities.
Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 5-6.
106. Harper, supra note 7, at 102.
107. Crespi, supra note 29, at 328. The stress on market processes distinguishes
Austrian economics from the neoclassical use of simplifying assumptions of "stable
equilibria and instantaneous adjustment." Id.
108. Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 5.
109. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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entrepreneurs to perceive and exploit opportunities in the form of
market gaps or disequilibrium.110
Austrian economists have begun to flesh out the implications of
Kirznerian entrepreneurship for the market process.'1 ' To some com-
mentators, Professor Kirzner's concept of entrepreneurship as "alert-
ness" emphasizes the "non-rational, intuitive faculties required of an
entrepreneur." '112 The Kirznerian entrepreneur will notice things that
are in her interest to notice, and thus very few hundred-dollar bills
reside long on a street in New York City. The Kirznerian conception
of entrepreneurship, however, has been criticized for not accounting
fully for the potential for learning or true creativity on the part of the
entrepreneur. 1 3 In the words of one Austrian economist, "[cihanges
in consumer tastes, technological possibilities and resource availabili-
ties are simply known by the alert and astute [Kirznerian] entrepre-
neur, although this knowledge may not be widely dispersed among
other market participants who might find it useful." 114 Entrepreneur-
ship is possible because other market participants simply have over-
looked information that the alert entrepreneur spots.'15
Not entirely satisfied with this model of entrepreneurship, others
have sought to understand better how an entrepreneur, faced with un-
certainty, espies an opportunity and translates her discovery into a
successful venture. Professor David Harper has proposed what he
calls a "growth of knowledge""' 6 model of entrepreneurship. Harper
110. Kirzner states:
[T]he market process view sees in this constant market agitation the essen-
tial sets of market forces that permit us to comprehend what is happening in
markets. This view sees the apparent chaos of market agitation as not cha-
otic at all; quite the contrary, it is in this apparently chaotic sequence of
market events that the market's orderliness resides. The central meaning of
the movements which we continually observe in markets is that discoveries
are being made concerning overlooked market gaps. Each such overlooked
opportunity constitutes at the same time (a) a disequilibrium feature in the
market, and (b) an exploitable opportunity for pure profit. It is the incentive
offered in the form of pure profit that inspires and motivates those en-
trepreneurial discoveries that tend to correct earlier features of
disequilibrium.
Id. at 49 n.8.
111. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 7, at 3 (developing a "dynamic theory of how
entrepreneurs learn" to address gaps in Kirzner's theory).
112. Id. at 6.
113. See id at 16-19.
114. Id at 17.
115. See id at 17-18.
116. Professor Harper develops his model from Karl R. Popper's theory of the
growth of scientific knowledge, which holds that there is no "infallible method avail-
able to us for acquiring knowledge which can guarantee us the truth." Id. at 4. Specif-
ically, Popper rejects inductive reasoning based upon empirical observation as a
method of discerning whether or not a theory is true. See Karl R. Popper, The Logic
of Scientific Discovery 27 (1992) ("[N]o matter how many instances of white swans we
may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.").
Rather, knowledge grows over time through a dynamic process in which scientific
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posits that entrepreneurs constantly formulate hypotheses in order to
solve problems presented and perceived through the market pro-
cess. 1 17 As the entrepreneur's hypotheses are proved false in the mar-
ket, the entrepreneur reformulates her ideas in a continuous loop of
trial and error. The "sophisticated falsificationist entrepreneur" relies
on logical reasoning, rational (and unyielding) criticism of her own
plans and theories, and a willingness to learn from mistakes.' 18
Through this weeding out of error, the entrepreneur gains and creates
knowledge, which she then translates into market action.
The entrepreneur engages in this process to sell her goods or serv-
ices in order to satisfy the wants and needs of consumers. The
Harperian entrepreneur's goals, and thus the goals of the market pro-
cess as well, are to "serve each other, to think how to improve serving
each other, to be willing to take risks in the face of uncertainty, and
... to be willing to commit themselves to... [learning]. '"" 9 Entrepre-
neurs must, therefore, be left alone to engage in the process of learn-
ing through mistakes in order that we may find those entrepreneurs
who can most satisfy our subjective desires.12 0 There is no alternative
to leaving markets (and thus entrepreneurs) free from interference
because it is impossible to identify "in advance which individuals will
conceive the best ideas."'' If successful, the entrepreneur draws imi-
tators who have observed the positive results of the entrepreneur's
actions, and the result is market competition. 22
hypotheses are tested, falsified, and reformulated. A scientific theory is never cer-
tainly true, despite the fact that every experiment to date has shown it to be accurate.
For example, Newtonian physics held sway for several hundred years until observa-
tional techniques improved to the point that physicists observed physical phenomena
that could not be explained adequately. These observations ushered in the era of
quantum physics as scientists developed new theories to replace Newtonian theories
that were now inadequate. Professor Harper seeks to apply this model of knowledge,
which he characterizes as "non-justificationist"-that is, it "divorces knowledge from
certainty, proof, and 'hard' facts"-to market processes. Harper, supra note 7, at 4
(citation omitted). The connection between Popper's philosophy of science and en-
trepreneurial activity is that "[like scientific enterprise, entrepreneurship is... essen-
tially . . . a problem-solving activity" which is an "inter-subjective and pluralistic
process for generating conjectures, exchanging and promoting ideas and attempting to
refute them." Id. at 5.
117. "Like scientists, entrepreneurs are constantly engaged in solving problems
which tend to involve much novelty and which are ill-specified. Problems are not
avoided, but actively sought as a challenge." Id. at 121.
118. Id. at 317-18.
119. Ivan Pongracic, How Entrepreneurs Learn: Book Review of Entrepreneurship
and the Market Process, in 4 Advances in Austrian Economics 231, 235 (Peter J.
Boettke et al. eds., 1997).
120. See id. at 236.
121. Id. at 236 (quoting Harper, supra note 7, at 292).
122. See Vaughn, supra note 28, at 156.
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E. Human Plans, Social Institutions, and the Austrian Theory of
the Firm
The work of Ludwig Lachmann on a theory of social institutions
supplements the Austrian emphasis on the entrepreneur and dynamic
market process. As an Austrian economist, Lachmann recognized the
importance of subjectivism, uncertainty, and the passage of time. In
his words, "[t]he future is unknowable, but not unimaginable."'"
Lachmann believed that human beings respond to uncertainty by for-
mulating "plans" that represent their best evaluation of the unpredict-
able future.124 In 1944, Lachmann wrote:
A social process consists of a number of mutually interrelated
human actions. To analyse a social process means to explore the
mode of this interrelationship, to dissect the process into actions.
To understand an action means not only to know what it is "for," its
purpose, but also to know the plan behind the action, to reduce "ac-
tion" to "plan". In analyzing a social process we have to start with
the plans of the individuals, for it is their simultaneous attempts to
carry out these plans-which may be inconsistent with each other
and are to that extent bound to fail-which give rise to the process
and determine its pattern. -5
To Lachmann, the plan is the first step in purposeful human action,
and thus the starting point for any economic model. '26
Moreover, Lachmann asserted that humans seek to "coordinate"
their plans, to the extent that they overlap, through the formation of
institutions that "provide[ ] means of orientation to a large number of
actors. [Social institutions] enable[ ] them to co-ordinate their actions
by means of orientation to a common signpost."' 7 Institutions are
therefore vital to society:
They enable each of us to rely on the actions of thousands of anony-
mous others about whose individual purposes and plans we can
know nothing. They are nodal points of society, co-ordinating the
actions of millions whom they relieve of the need to acquire and
digest detailed knowledge about others and form detailed expecta-
tions about their future action.12
Thus, the entrepreneur, if necessary, may combine her plan with the
plans of others in order to take advantage of their dispersed knowl-
edge that the social institution coordinates to the advantage of all. In-
dividuals' plans "crystallize" spontaneously into institutions which
"are the relics of the pioneering efforts of former generations from
123. 1& at 152 (quoting Lachmann, supra note 64, at 55).
124. See id. at 155.
125. Ludwig Lachmann, Finance Capitalism?, in Lachmann, Expectations and Insti-
tutions, supra note 64, at 107, 118.
126. See iU
127. Lachmann, The Legacy of Max Weber, supra note 64, at 49-50.
128. Id. at 50.
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which we are still drawing benefit.' 11 9 Lachmann's insights regarding
societal institutions in general are, of course, crucial to the develop-
ment of an "Austrian" theory of the firm.
Despite the efforts of a few scholars, there is a noticeable dearth of
information or interest among Austrian economists in the theory of
the firm, which is all the more striking because of the extant Lachman-
nian approach to social institutions. 13 From an Austrian perspective,
the mainstream theories of the firm' 31 are deficient in several particu-
129. Id. at 68.
130. Nicolai J. Foss, Austrian Insights and the Theory of the Firm, in 4 Advances in
Austrian Economics 175, 186 (Peter J. Boettke et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Foss,
Theory of the Firm]. Professor Foss notes that the scholars who have worked to dc-
velop a theory of the firm with an Austrian flavor all have been non-Austrians, includ-
ing Professor Foss himself. Id.; see Foss, The Austrian School, supra note 31, at 152
(especially chapter 8); Richard N. Langlois, Orders and Organizations: Toward an
Austrian Theory of Social Institutions, in Austrian Economics: Tensions and New Di-
rections 165, 174-78 (Bruce J. Caldwell & Stephan Boehm eds., 1992); Richard N.
Langlois, Transaction-Cost Economics in Real Time, 1 Indus. & Corp. Change 99, 105-
21 (1992).
131. In the neoclassical theory of the firm, a manager buys and sells economic in-
puts and outputs in a spot market in an effort to maximize the profit to the owner. See
Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1757, 1759 (1989). In principal-agent theory professional managers (the agents) run
the corporation on behalf of the owners (the principals). See id. Because the manag-
ers have their own agendas, their interests will not be congruent to those of the own-
ers, so the task of the owners are to give their agents the incentives to minimize the
conflict between the principals and the agents. See id.
In contrast to the neoclassical tradition stands the "transaction cost" explanation of
the firm. In 1937, Professor Ronald Coase wrote his brilliant article, Tie Nature of
the Firm, in which he hypothesized that firms are alternatives to the market. Ronald
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, n.s., 4 (1937), reprinted in Ronald H.
Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law 33 (1988). Professor Coase explained that
firms arise due to the transaction costs (although he did not use that term) of con-
tracting for resources in the market. See id. at 38-42. The boundary line between
contracting through firms and in the market is the point at which the transaction costs
of doing so through either institution is equal. See id. at 40. See also Armen A. Al-
chian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organiza-
tion, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 783-95 (1972) (extending Coase's theory of the firm by
introducing the concepts of team production, asymmetric information, and moral haz-
ard, concluding that successful firms are those that minimalize monitoring costs).
In another landmark paper, Professors Jensen and Meckling proposed the "nexus
of contracts" theory of the firm:
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships.... Viewed this way, it makes
little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are "inside" the firm
... from those things that are "outside" of it. There is in a very real sense
only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal
fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and
the consumers of output.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Beha-
viour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 311 (1976).
Finally, the "property rights" theory of the firm focuses on the rights of various firm
actors to the physical assets of the firm. Owners of physical assets control their use,
which, in turn, gives them leverage in negotiating how to split the profits generated by
those assets. See Hart, supra, at 1767-68. The firm structure enables the parties to
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lars. First, economic decision-makers in mainstream theories are
presented with a series of contractual alternatives from which they
choose.132 The economic decision-maker is faced with the choice be-
tween whether to engage in market contracting transactions or form a
firm or some other entity.133 The decision-makers's choice is driven
by a given set of factors. 34 The only choice available to the decision-
maker in these models is the discretion to choose the optimum con-
tracting mechanism, a choice that is obvious given that all factors im-
pacting the decision are stipulated. In other words, there is no room
for entrepreneurship, and it is no surprise that mainstream theories of
the firm do not account satisfactorily for entrepreneurial activity.
Second, there is no market process in the mainstream accounts.
135
The principal of the firm hires an agent to carry out the principal's
wishes with regard to production, subject only to the agent's tendency
to be risk-averse.' 36 The only interesting question is whether the risk-
averse agent will act in the interest of the principal, given the risks and
rewards of doing so, or whether the agent will act in his own self-
interest. The principal's main task is figuring out how to optimize the
tradeoff between the principal's desired outcome and the risk aversion
of the agent. In the mainstream models, the principal is able to design
the optimum structure to solve the contracting problems, and this so-
lution continues to be optimal over time.'3 7
Third, mainstream models assume strong knowledge on the part of
different economic actors.138 Although information may be asymmet-
rically distributed among individual economic decision-makers, main-
stream models still assume that other individuals, for example, the
principal of the firm, have perfect knowledge of the alternatives open
to their agents. 39 Thus, the principal of a firm can never be genuinely
surprised by the results of her agents' actions, nor can there be any
true discovery of market opportunities in the sense used by Austrian
economists. 40
These critiques open the door to the development of a unique Aus-
trian theory of the firm, which has been a focus in the work of Profes-
sor Nicolai Foss and his collaborators. Professor Foss applies the
general Austrian critique of neoclassical economics to the firm-un-
determine who owns particular assets and the extent of those property rights. See id.
at 1771. In this Article, I adopt Professor Foss's habit of referring to these theories
under the general rubric of "mainstream theories" of the firm.
132. See Foss, Theory of the Firm, supra note 130, at 182.
133. See id.
134. See itL
135. See id.
136. See id
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 183.
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realistic assumptions regarding the knowledge of economic actors, a
failure to take account of real time and therefore of market processes,
and, finally, a failure to account for genuine uncertainty and the abil-
ity of economic actors to learn and generate knowledge through
entrepreneurship.'41
Firms are examples of what Friedrich Hayek labeled a planned (as
distinguished from a spontaneous) order.'42 The Lachmannian theory
of social institutions leads to the question of what form of institution
will best coordinate the subjective plans of different individuals.'43
Building upon Hayek's insights on the nature of knowledge in society,
Austrian economists describe institutions, such as firms, as pools of
idiosyncratic, local knowledge. Employing this knowledge, firms facil-
itate spontaneous learning on a local (as opposed to global or market)
level.'44 Therefore, firms have a dual nature-they are planned or-
ders that permit a spontaneous, unplanned procedure "which both
makes the utilization of more facts possible ... and which provides the
incentive for constant discovery of new facts which improve adapta-
tion to the ever-changing circumstances of the world in which we
live."' 45 Knowledge in firms is coordinated through diktat by deci-
sion-makers or, usually unconsciously, by "routines" or corporate cul-
ture. 146 Routines that permit the firm to discover knowledge are
selected over those that do not.
Professor Foss has explored in detail the types of knowledge that
inhere in firms. Distributed knowledge resides in the firm's agents as
a group, but which no one individual agent has in toto. 147 Foss cites
the example of General Motors ("GM")-the individuals who make
up GM know as a group how to make automobiles, but no one indi-
vidual possesses the full knowledge necessary to make them.'48 GM
must devise ways to coordinate the information found in the pool of
its employees in order to successfully manufacture a car. 1 49 To Foss,
the fundamental purpose of the firm is to provide a structure that will
141. See id. at 186.
142. See Hayek, I Law, Legislation and Liberty, supra note 52, at 49-50; see Foss,
The Austrian School, supra note 31, at 157 (citing Hayek, I Law, Legislation and Lib-
erty, supra note 52, at 48-52).
143. See Foss, Theory of the Firm, supra note 130, at 177.
144. See Foss, The Austrian School, supra note 31, at 174.
145. Friedrich A. Hayek, The New Confitsion About "Planning", in Hayek, New
Studies, supra note 52, at 236. Though Hayek was speaking in terms of the market,
his insight applies equally to the spontaneous generation of knowledge within the
firm.
146. See Foss, The Austrian School, supra note 31, at 173; see also Foss, Theory of
the Firm, supra note 130, at 186 ("[Fjirms are indeed planned orders in the Hayekian
sense. However.... social institutions do not just fall neatly into two separate catego-
ries: spontaneous and planned orders .... [Flirms contain 'grown' elements, such as
what goes under the name of 'corporate culture.'").
147. Foss, Theory of the Firm, supra note 130, at 190.
148. See id. at 189.
149. See id.
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coordinate the distributed knowledge of the firm's actors so that their
plans dovetail in an effort to accomplish the overarching plan of the
firm.15 "Thus, it is the more basic coordination problem of making
activities, individual efforts, learning processes, strategies, and so on
mesh that is highlighted, rather than the logically secondary problem
of, for example, controlling and influencing the level of efforts once
everything is in place."''
Firms solve this coordination problem in several ways.152 For exam-
ple, corporate routines or culture permit the firm to coordinate dis-
tributed knowledge without constantly having to "reinvent the
wheel."' 53 These routines themselves evolve over time, and are thus
an example of Hayekian "spontaneous order" within the firm.'1 A
second coordinating solution is found in the actions of individuals
whom Foss labels "intrapreneurs,"'15 5 who act as Austrian-style entre-
preneurs within the firm to improve its method of coordinating knowl-
edge and plans. A third example is management acting by command
to ensure that the plans of one division of the firm are coordinated
with those of the other. 56
The Austrian firm thus provides a knowledge-coordinating structure
geared to facilitating local discovery procedures through which firm
actors engage in entrepreneurial activity in furtherance of the firm's
overall business strategy. Professor Harper calls a firm's business plan
its "entrepreneurial research programme" which itself is subject to
formulation, testing, refutation, and reformulation through the market
process. 57 Thus, it is no exaggeration to observe that the Austrian
theory of the firm reserves a central role for the entrepreneur and
entrepreneurial action at all levels of the firm. This model is consis-
tent with Mises's view that the entrepreneur, not the manager, is the
heart of the corporation and the key to its success.15 1
As the foregoing introduction indicates, Austrian economics is in-
deed a middle ground between neoclassical economics and ultra-radi-
cal subjectivists. Subjectivism taken too far denies the possibility of
any predictions or models of the real world, and thus rejects the possi-
150. Professor Foss writes: "Rather than transforming noncooperative behavior in
potential prisoners dilemma games to cooperative behavior, the role of firms ... is to
provide an institutional setting that solves coordination type games.... Or, translated
into the terminology that has been employed here, it is a matter of making distributed
knowledge mesh." Id. at 191.
151. Id.
152. See id at 192-93.
153. See id. at 191.
154. See id at 192.
155. "Corporate 'intrapreneurs' may act in a basically Kirznerian way by demon-
strating alertness to opportunities for integrating hitherto dispersed knowledge." Id.
at 192.
156. Professor Foss used these examples in his work. See id. at 191-92.
157. Harper, supra note 7, at 350.
158. See Mises, Human Action, supra note 51, at 703-04.
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bility of elucidating social phenomena through human reason. In
short, it denies the possibility of a science of human action.
On the other hand, neoclassicists employ assumptions that enable
them to explain certain aspects of the world, but those models cannot
be reliably used in all circumstances because they abstract too far
from reality. I believe this latter point accounts for the inability of
traditional law and economics scholarship to provide a justification for
the chapter 11 process.
The Austrian approach to economics not only explains the structure
of chapter 11, but also dictates that a process such as chapter 11 is the
only alternative if the goal is to ensure that viable "going concerns"
will remain in business once they emerge from bankruptcy. I discuss
these points further in part IV of this Article, but first, a brief intro-
duction to the history and structure of chapter 11 provides the neces-
sary context for discussion.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION PROCESS
I will now turn to the subject at hand-chapter 11 of the Code. This
part examines the history and structure of the corporate reorganiza-
tion process, not of the Code in general. The emphasis on process
obviously is relevant to the Austrian economic approach described
above. 15 9 My intent is to provide the context necessary to reveal the
exegetical power of the Austrian economic approach to the search for
a satisfactory "explanation" for chapter 11.
A. The Historical Development of Chapter 11
Chapter 11 is the result of a long process of evolution in commercial
affairs. Scholars have sifted through the historical record and have
largely illuminated from whence bankruptcy law sprung, but their ef-
forts have not discerned conclusively the reasons chapter 11 devel-
oped as it did. 6 ' Though scholars generally trace the antecedents of
159. See supra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, Corporate Bankruptcy in America 1-24 (1971)
(discussing the evolution of bankruptcy law in the United States); Peter J. Coleman,
Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bank-
ruptcy 1607-1900 (1974) (studying how society dealt with insolvent debtors in the 17th
and 18th centuries); F. Regis Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Law 182-200 (1919)
(stating the rationale behind American style bankruptcy combining both practical and
humanitarian considerations); Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History
95-159 (1935) (discussing the change in bankruptcy law between 1861 and 1935); Ed-
ward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improv-
ing Results, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 581, 584-92 (1993) (exploring the historical antecedents of
chapter 11); Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 Com. L.
J. 226, 228-32 (1976) (discussing the history of United States bankruptcy acts); John C.
McCoid II, Discharge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70
Am. Bankr. L.J. 163, 185-92 (1996) [hereinafter McCoid, Discharge] (discussing the
impact of history on present day bankruptcy laws); John C. McCoid II, The Origins of
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modem bankruptcy law to ancient Rome,16' the direct forebear of
American bankruptcy law was the English law of creditors' reme-
dies.162 In its earliest forms, English law sanctioned harsh punitive
measures against defaulting debtors. 63 The first English bankruptcy
laws, passed in 1542 and 1570,164 were characteristic of bankruptcy law
as it existed for the next several hundred years. 16 5 These early English
statutes were exclusively creditors' remedies. There was no discharge
of debts. Bankruptcy could not be initiated voluntarily by the
debtor-all cases were involuntary and were commenced by creditors
upon the commission of an "act of bankruptcy" by the debtor. Any
act that heightened a creditor's unease about the prospects for repay-
ment of a debt was sufficient basis for beginning a bankruptcy case
against a debtor. The debtor's assets were assembled and sold, and
creditors shared the proceeds on a pro rata basis. The debtor re-
mained liable for any shortfall. Bankruptcy law applied only to
merchant debtors. 66
A critically important development in English law was the introduc-
tion in 1705 of the discharge of debts,167 though its genesis actually
may have been in the mid-seventeenth century." Professor John Mc-
Coid has meticulously traced the events leading up to the introduction
of the discharge in English law, and has concluded that it signaled a
shift in bankruptcy law from a collection device to a form of the com-
mon law remedy of "creditors' composition.' 169 In a "creditors' com-
position," the debtor and his creditors voluntarily agree to a
repayment plan whereby creditors generally receive less than full pay-
Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 Bankr. Dev. J. 361, 362-84 (1988) (examining the roles of
various individuals on developing bankruptcy law); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History
of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L Rev. 5, 6-32 (1995)
[hereinafter Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws] (examining the history of bank-
ruptcy law prior to 1978).
161. See Countryman, supra note 160, at 226. "In Rome, creditors were apparently
authorized to carve up the body of the debtor, although scholars debate the extent to
which the letter of that law was actually enforced." Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy
Laws, supra note 160, at 7.
162. See Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 160, at 7 (citing Statute
of Merchants, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 3 (1285); Statute of Acton Burnel, 11 Edw. 1 (1283);
Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, chs. 11, 18 & 45 (1285)).
163. See i.
164. These statutes were 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43) & 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570),
passed during the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, respectively.
165. See Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 160, at 8.
166. The foregoing discussion of early English and American bankruptcy law is
drawn from Professor Tabb's excellent summary. See id. at 7-23.
167. See Countryman, supra note 160, at 227.
168. See McCoid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 181-85. Indeed, the English author
Daniel Defoe, perhaps the first celebrity debtor, was an earlier and eloquent propo-
nent of the discharge. See id. at 169-73. Defoe, however, seems not to have invented
the idea, and its precise origin remains unclear. See id. at 179-81.
169. See hi at 179-85.
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ment of their claims against the debtor. 170 Professor McCoid asserts
that the purpose of the discharge was to buttress the statutory credi-
tors' composition by ensuring an orderly repayment of creditors that
was binding on dissenters,'171 thus alleviating the major problem with
the common law remedy-holdout creditors.172  The statutory ap-
proach notably did not displace the consensual bargain model with a
set of statutory rules; rather, the law sought to give the parties flexibil-
ity in arriving at the "composition agreement" within general legal
rules which preserved baseline rights of creditors. 173 Importantly, this
170. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy 25 (1997) [hereinafter Tabb,
The Law of Bankruptcy].
171. See McCoid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 183.
172. The common law version had limited utility in the face of holdout creditors,
reflecting, perhaps, the fact that it was born in an era when debtors had few creditors,
debtors were considered quasi-criminals, and the holdout problem was minimal. As
commerce expanded and holdouts became problematic in attempting creditors' com-
positions, the introduction of the bankruptcy discharge makes sense as a statutory
guarantor of a successful workout agreement. Indeed, the powerful "creditors' bar-
gain" model reinforces Professor McCoid's historical argument in an important sense.
The creditors' bargain theory asserts that the Code is structured to vindicate the ex-
pectations of creditors who hypothetically bargain ex ante regarding the distribution
of the debtor's property in a subsequent bankruptcy case. See generally Jackson, Logic
and Limits, supra note 11, at 214-16 (discussing the underlying justification for the
bargaining process). The historical development of bankruptcy law in a way that re-
flects the agreement of creditors in a hypothetical ex ante bargain represents a
Lachmannian crystallization into law of the bargain upon which creditors would insist
in a common law composition agreement. Rather than sanction bargaining over a
plan for repayment of creditors in the typical chapter 7 liquidation, bankruptcy law
reduces to statute the spontaneously generated routines of creditors under workout
agreements, thereby saving creditors the costs of bargaining with the debtor and
among themselves in every case.
173. Professor McCoid's analysis is quite illuminating:
One virtue of the statutory approach is that it avoids the defects of the con-
sensual scheme. At common law, no creditor was bound without assenting
to a composition; and, the terms of the agreement necessarily were the sub-
ject of negotiation among the debtor and his creditors. Holdouts or dis-
agreements about the appropriate terms could prevent a consensual
arrangement. Statutory composition avoids both of these pitfalls. Nonas-
senting creditors can be bound by a settlement the terms of which are fixed.
On the other hand, the principal strength of consensual composition was its
flexibility, an attribute hard to achieve by legislation. The parties to an
agreement could specify whatever terms they chose. Thus, another virtue of
the 1706 experiment was that it did not totally replace bargain with rule. It
allowed the two to coexist so that the advantages of both forms of composi-
tion became available. Doubtless, any composition agreement had to be
formed against the background of the alternative rule, but the parties re-
mained free to strike a different accord when they believed circumstances
warranted it.
McCoid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 184. Among Austrian economists, Friedrich
Hayek in particular studied law as an institution from an Austrian perspective. See
Hayek, Constitution, supra note 52, at viii. Hayek stressed the importance of general
rules that were rigorously enforced as the best way of structuring a legal system, pre-
cisely the approach to bankruptcy law that Professor McCoid identifies. See id. at 148-
61.
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view of bankruptcy law was the prevailing English law at the time of
the ratification of the United States Constitution. 74
The framers of the Constitution included the Bankruptcy Clause 7 -
among the enumerated powers of Congress because of the perceived
interplay between the congressional power to regulate commerce and
the potential interstate nature of debt collection. 76 Congress chose to
exercise its power under the Bankruptcy Clause only sporadically for
the first hundred years of the Constitution's history. Though Con-
gress passed bankruptcy laws (largely in response to financial crises)
in 1800, 1841, and 1867,1i it was not until the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
that Congress passed a comprehensive and enduring statute. 17  Inno-
vations associated with these early statutes include the extension of
bankruptcy relief to non-merchant debtors, the authorization of vol-
untary bankruptcy cases, and the provision of exemptions for debt-
ors.1 79 Critically for the history of chapter 11, the 1874 bankruptcy
law formally introduced the concept of a "composition agreement"
which permitted the debtor to receive a discharge and keep his prop-
erty in exchange for agreeing to pay off a certain percentage of debts
over time.8 0
A second key development in the late nineteenth century was the
railroad equity receivership.' 8 ' It is difficult to comprehend from our
present vantage point the influence and importance of railroads at the
end of the last century. In an era of robust competition lacking a fed-
eral bankruptcy law, the inevitable insolvencies of railroads presented
legal and social problems that simply had to be solved.' s2 Equity
courts adapted the equity receivership procedure to fill the gap.s In
such receiverships, the court would appoint a trustee, generally the
174. See id at 176-92.
175. "Congress shall have the power... to establish uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
176. See The Federalist No. 41 (James Madison) ("The power of establishing uni-
form laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce,
and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be
removed into different States .... ).
177. See Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 160, at 12-23 (concisely
summarizing early American bankruptcy statutes).
178. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
179. See Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 160, at 12-23.
180. See id. at 21.
181. See Adams, supra note 160, at 584-87.
182. Adams describes the necessity of bankruptcy laws for railroads:
Railroads possessed enormous assets, rights of way over narrow strips of
land, and hundreds or even thousands of miles of iron rails, yet these assets
had little scrap value-what else could these assets be used for if not a rail-
road? .... Complicating the plight of insolvent railroads was an ineffective
legal system; federal legislation was in a constant state of flux and limited
state remedies proved inadequate because railroad lines, unlike state juris-
diction, generally extended across several states.
Id at 585 (footnote omitted).
183. See id.
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old management of the railroad, to take control of the corporate as-
sets and run the business during the receivership.' 84 This brought the
railroad's assets under the jurisdiction of the chancellor, thus insulat-
ing them from execution by creditors.'" 5 Creditors' committees then
developed a reorganization plan that specified what creditors would
receive in exchange for relinquishing their claims to a court-appointed
reorganization committee. 186 The committee purchased the railroad's
assets at a foreclosure sale and placed them in a newly formed
corporation. 18
7
Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898188 did not contain any
provisions geared to corporate debtors, but when Congress amended
the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler Act'1 9 in 1938, it added three
separate chapters specifically designed for corporate reorganiza-
tions. 190 Congress intended corporations to choose the chapter best
suited to the size and complexity of the case. Chapter XI of the Act,
however, eclipsed the other two chapters for several reasons: man-
agement remained in control of the corporation in chapter XI, thus
insulating management from an independent trustee; management
had the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization; the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission had less of a role in chapter XI cases; and
chapter XI adjusted unsecured debts only, making it a simpler alterna-
tive to the more comprehensive adjustments available in other
chapters.191
In 1970, Congress created a Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States charged with reviewing the Bankruptcy Act.' 92
The Commission's review of the reorganization provisions of the
Chandler Act led to the enactment of the present Code. Chapter 11
reflects both the fruits of the historical evolution of bankruptcy law
and legislative compromise over perceived problems with previous
law. I will now turn to the chapter 11 process as it exists today.
184. See id. at 586 (citing Investment Registry, Ltd v. Chicago & M. Elec. R.R., 212
F. 594, 609 (7th Cir. 1913); Duncan v. Mobile & O.R.R., 8 F. Cas. 25, 26 (C.C.S.D.
Ala. 1879)).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 586-87. The description of the equity receivership that follows is
drawn from Professor Adams's excellent discussion. See id. at 585-87.
188. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
189. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938).
190. See Adams, supra note 160, at 587-90 (describing the Bankruptcy Act reorgan-
ization provisions).
191. See id. at 589-90.
192. See id. at 590-91.
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B. The Chapter 11 Process
Upon the filing of a chapter 11 case, a "debtor-in-possession"
("DIP") 19 3 of the bankruptcy "estate"'194 takes control of "property of
the estate."'1 9 5 The DIP has the power to keep the debtor's business
running during the chapter 11 process.'96 The DIP is aided in running
the bankruptcy estate by the "automatic stay," which arises by opera-
tion of law upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The stay en-
joins any entity from taking any of the following actions: collecting on
pre-bankruptcy debts; enforcing pre-petition judgments; obtaining
property of the bankruptcy estate; 97 creating or perfecting liens
against estate property; and collecting any claim against the debtor
that arose before the bankruptcy case.198 The stated purpose of the
automatic stay is to give the debtor a "breathing spell" from creditor
actions that would impede the DIP's efforts to reorganize the corpora-
tion.199 Bankruptcy courts also have the power to "issue any order,
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (defining a debtor-in-possession
as "the debtor" except in a chapter 11 case where a trustee has been appointed); id.
§ 1107 (providing that a debtor-in-possession has most of the powers of a bankruptcy
trustee). The Supreme Court has further stated that "it is sensible to view the debtor-
in-possession as the same 'entity' which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts
and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the bankruptcy filing."
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994) ("The commencement of a [bankruptcy] case...
creates an estate.").
195. See id. § 541(a)(1) (providing that the bankruptcy "estate" is comprised of "all
legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
[bankruptcy] case").
196. Indeed, the Code makes clear that the U.S. trustee has the power to run the
debtor's business for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. See id. § 1108.
197. See supra note 195.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) reads, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section .... [the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition] operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceed-
ing against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before
the commencement of the case .... or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case... ;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case... ;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title.
Id. § 362(a).
199. The House report explains the benefits of an automatic stay:
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process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions" of the Code, a power that courts have exercised to supple-
ment the automatic stay, if necessary, to foster the reorganization
effort.20o
The DIP continues to operate the corporation through various pow-
ers granted to the DIP by the Code: to use, sell, or lease property of
the estate;201 to obtain credit, in or outside the ordinary course of
business;2 0 2 to assume or reject executory contracts or unexpired
leases on behalf of the estate;203 to recover the debtor's property in
the possession of third parties;" and to recover property for the
bankruptcy estate through several avoiding powers.20 5 The debtor has
the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization for the first 120
days of the case, and the exclusive right to have that plan accepted by
creditors for the first 180 days.20 6 After this "exclusivity period," any
"party in interest" may file a plan.20 7
The DIP may be replaced with a trustee, but the presumption is that
the DIP will run and reorganize the business in chapter 11.208 Before
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by
the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.
It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It
permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply
to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Courts are prudent in invoking § 105, and generally only
exercise their power in chapter 11 cases where pressure on key people related in some
way to the debtor-such as guarantors or indemnitors of corporate obligations or
other principals of the corporation-face creditor pressure which the court finds will
interfere with the DIP's ability to propose a plan of reorganization. See, e.g., A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003-07 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a court
must weigh competing interests when determining whether to grant relief); F.T.L.,
Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 152 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (utilizing a four-part test
to determine whether to grant an injunction against creditors pursuing their debts).
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
202. See id. § 364.
203. See id. § 365.
204. See id. § 542.
205. See id. §§ 544-545, 547-550, 553.
206. See id. § 1121 (b), (c). These periods may be extended by a bankruptcy court
"for cause" if the request is made during the original time period. Id. § 1121(d).
207. The phrase "party in interest" is not defined in the Code, but is interpreted
quite broadly to include "anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be
affected by a bankruptcy proceeding." In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 169
(7th Cir. 1992). Two provisions of chapter 11 contain a list of parties who are included
in the phrase "party in interest", but neither list is exhaustive-"the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holder's committee, . . . or any
indenture trustee." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1109(b), 1121(c).
208. See In re Tahkenitch Tree Farm Partnership, 156 B.R. 525, 527 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1993) (stating that "appointment of a trustee should be the exception, rather than
the rule"); In re Madison Management Group, Inc., 137 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1992) (stating that "appointment of a trustee... is an extraordinary remedy"); In
re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that "ap-
pointment of a trustee in a chapter 11 case is an extraordinary remedy"); In re Micro-
wave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989) (stating that
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a bankruptcy court will displace the existing management of the
debtor, the party seeking the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee
must show, by clear and convincing evidence, something more than
mere mismanagement2 9 of the sort likely to be present in every bank-
ruptcy case.210 In an appropriate case, the court may appoint an ex-
aminer to investigate the debtor's affairs as necessary. 211
The Code contemplates other entities or parties taking an active
role in the case. The United States trustee212 must appoint a creditors'
committee,213 normally made up of the seven largest unsecured credi-
tors. The primary purpose of the creditors' committee is to facilitate
negotiations between the creditors and the debtor of a consensual
plan of reorganization, 1 4 though, as a practical matter, committees
"appointment of a trustee is the exception rather than the rule in chapter 11 cases");
see also Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganization
Cases, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 385,397-400 (1998) (discussing appointment of chapter
11 trustees and analyzing cases).
209. "The philosophy of chapter 11 is to give the debtor a 'second chance' and,
consistent with such philosophy, current management should be permitted to identify
and correct its past mistakes." Ionosphere, 113 B.R. at 168 (citations omitted); see also
In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 120 B.R. 164, 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (attempting
to distinguish between mismanagement and the additional facts which militate toward
the appointment of a trustee); Cuevas, supra note 208, at 397-98 (discussing misman-
agement in chapter 11 cases).
210. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re PMH
Corp., 116 B.R. 644, 646 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
211. The Code provides:
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section,
then at any time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in
interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the
court shall order the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investi-
gation of the debtor as is appropriate, including.., any allegations of fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in
the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former man-
agement [if the appointment is in the best interest of the creditors or auto-
matically in certain large chapter 11 cases].
11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994).
212. The United States trustee is an employee of the U.S. Treasury Department
who has the general duty to monitor the administration of bankruptcy cases, particu-
larly chapter 11 reorganizations, and investigate the operation of the debtor's busi-
ness. See id. §§ 307, 321-322. The U.S. trustee may appear on any matter in the
bankruptcy case itself. When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, Congress
sought to separate out the administrative duties from judicial decision-making, both
of which previously resided in one person, the Bankruptcy Referee, under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 89-91, 107 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6050-53, 6069.
213. Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
[A]s soon as practicable after the order for relief under chapter 11 of this
title, the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of
equity security holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
214. The Code provides that the creditors' committee may do the following:
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the adminis-
tration of the case;
2974 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
are often not formed. Moreover, those committees that are appointed
are hamstrung from having a large impact on the reorganization plan
unless the DIP wishes to include the committee in shaping the plan. 15
The Code's only directive concerning the interaction of the creditors'
committee and the DIP is that they meet "[a]s soon as practicable"
after the committee is formed to transact business.2 1 6 The congres-
sional vision for a chapter 11 case is for the parties to negotiate a
consensual, binding plan of reorganization that preserves the corpora-
tion's "going concern" value, defined as the value of the corporation
above its liquidation value. 17
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of
the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of
the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the
case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by
such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan for-
mulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a
plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of
this title; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c); see also In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Man-
ley, Myerson & Casey, 85 B.R. 13, 16-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (indicating that
under § 1103(c) a committee's primary purpose is "negotiation of a satisfactory plan
of reorganization"); Cuevas, supra note 208, at 396-97 (stating that under § 1103(c)
the "debtor's management is at liberty to proceed as it desires concerning... day-to-
day management"); Andrew DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code-A Primer, 55 Am. Bankr. L.J. 43, 52 (1981) (noting that "the scope of
the [committee's] investigation is potentially very broad"); Kenneth N. Klee & K.
John Shaffer, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 44
S.C. L. Rev. 995, 1000-01 (1993) (providing examples of the permissible functions of a
creditor's committee).
215. As Professor Cuevas has noted:
[Chapter 11] fails to grant a creditors' committee any authority concerning
the day-to-day operations of the debtor, the development of a business plan,
or the debtor's restructuring. A creditors' committee's inability to have any
input concerning the preceding matters not only places it in a powerless po-
sition, but also places the unsecured creditors in a similar position concern-
ing the debtor's daily operations and the debtor's business plan. The estate
might not have the funds necessary to compensate creditors' committee
counsel for litigation .... Consequently, debtor's management is at liberty
to proceed as it desires concerning the debtor's day-to-day management, the
debtor's business plan, and the debtor's restructuring ....
Cuevas, supra note 208, at 396-97 (footnote omitted); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?,
57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 247, 250 (1983) (noting that in a study in the Bankruptcy Court in
the Western District of Missouri shortly after the enactment of the Code a creditors'
committee was appointed in only 40% of the chapter 11 cases studied, and that the
trend appeared to be away from appointing committees in such cases).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d) (1994) ("As soon as practicable after the appointment of a
committee under section 1102 of this title, the trustee shall meet with such committee
to transact such business as may be necessary and proper.").
217. The legislative history states that the goal of chapter 11 is:
to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, pro-
vide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its
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Theoretically, therefore, the parties capture the debtor's going con-
cern value through the negotiation, confirmation, and implementation
of a plan of reorganization.2 1 1 The Code does not dictate how the
plan should be formulated, though it does spell out certain require-
ments that must be met before a court can confirm it. First, the plan
must state how the DIP plans to structure and run the corporation's
operations in the future. 19 The bankruptcy court must determine in-
dependently that the DIP's plan for the corporation is feasible, in that
it will not be followed inevitably by a liquidation of the company. 22
The plan must divide creditors into "classes" holding "substantially
similar" claims, and disclose how the members of each class will be
treated.2 1 A threshold requirement is that each creditor in a class
that is not being paid in full m2mthat is, a member of an "impaired"
class-can insist that they receive under the reorganization plan at
least as much as they would in a liquidation of the debtor.223 Obvi-
stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. 6179.
218. One commentator describes the chapter 11 model as follows:
Within modest limits, chapter 11 is based on a model of flexibility, open
bargaining, and freedom of contract. The basic premise is that the stake-
holders in the reorganization are free to carve up reorganization value in
whatever manner they see fit-as long as they do so advisedly. This ap-
proach marks a sea change [from the Bankruptcy Act] which was predicated
on a model of paternalistic oversight by various benevolent watchdogs, such
as the court, the independent trustee, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 824 (footnotes omitted).
219. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5). Of course, other parties other than the DIP may
be the proponent of a plan of reorganization, once the appropriate exclusivity period
has run. See id § 1121. For simplicity, I will assume hereafter that the plan proponent
is the DIP unless otherwise stated.
220. See i& § 1129(a)(11). Specifically, the Code states that a plan shall not be
confirmed unless "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liqui-
dation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor
to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in
the plan." ld.; see also In re Merrimack Valley Oil Co., 32 B.R. 485,490-91 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983) (refusing to confirm plan because it did not meet § 1129(a)(11) require-
ment of feasibility); In re Landmark at Plaza Park Ltd., 7 B.R. 653, 663 (Bankr. D.NJ.
1980) (same).
221. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(1). Unless otherwise agreed, each creditor within a
particular class must receive identical treatment. See id. § 1123(a)(4).
222. Members of a class that is being paid in full--"unimpaired" creditors-are not
entitled to vote on the confirmation of the plan as they are deemed to have voted in
favor of the plan. See id § 1126(0. This rule prevents creditors who are receiving full
payment on their claims, but not in the form for which they bargained (such as se-
cured creditors receiving payments equal to the value of their collateral rather than
being able to foreclose), from voting against the plan because they are displeased with
the mode of payment. See Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 819.
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A). A plan that does not meet this requirement
nevertheless may be confirmed if no impaired creditor objects. Conversely,
unimpaired creditors do not have recourse to this important protection, reflecting the
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ously, if the DIP cannot meet this "best interest of creditors" test, it
makes no sense to attempt to formulate a plan of reorganization, as
chapter 11 is an expensive alternative to a chapter 7 liquidation.2 4
Furthermore, the plan must be proposed in good faith, and both the
plan and its proponent must comply with all of the provisions of chap-
ter 11.225
The pre-petition shareholders of the corporation normally receive
nothing on account of their stock because impaired classes of creditors
are entitled to insist on full payment before the equityholders receive
anything.2 26 Thus, "[c]reditors effectively own bankrupt firms.122 7 In
fact, their vote on the plan of reorganization determines the future of
the corporation.
Creditors vote on the plan after the plan proponent has disclosed
enough information so that a reasonable investor would be able to
make an informed decision regarding the plan.22 8 A plan is approved
if half the creditors in number and creditors that hold at least two-
thirds in amount vote to accept it.22 9 If a class or classes of impaired
claims reject the plan, the plan may be confirmed despite the vote of
that class or classes if certain statutory conditions are met. One such
condition is that at least one impaired class has accepted the plan.230
In sum, the chapter 11 process works by holding creditors at bay
while the DIP works out a plan of reorganization. At that point, the
creditors are divided into classes of similar claim holders, and then
have their chance to vote. Once accepted by the creditors, the plan is
judged through the Code's rules that preserve the creditors' non-
bankruptcy rights, while at the same time forcing them to accede to
the DIP's plan, sometimes against their will. I argue in the next part
that this process (or one similar to it), which has evolved gradually
fact that they will receive full payment of their claims under the plan and therefore
under the debtor's plan they are opting out of future involvement with the debtor
corporation. See Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 819-20.
224. The costs of the process are one of the major drawbacks of chapter 11. See
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 285, 285 (1990).
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)-(3).
226. This is the "absolute priority rule" which is codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). For a discussion of the process by which prior shareholders might
receive an ownership interest in the reorganized debtor, see infra notes 302-05 and
accompanying text.
227. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360
(7th Cir. 1990).
228. The plan proponent must file with, and have approved by, the court a "disclo-
sure statement" that must contain information adequate to permit a "reasonable in-
vestor" to make an "informed judgment" concerning the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
(b).
229. See id. § 1126(c).
230. See id. § 1129(a)(8), (b). This procedure is called "cramdown," which I discuss
in more detail at infra notes 290-313 and accompanying text.
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over time, is the only alternative to liquidating corporations if the goal
is to successfully reorganize corporations.
III. AN "AUSTRIAN" THEORY OF CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION LAW
Without an accurate understanding of markets and entrepreneurial
action, there can be no free market model of the law of corporate
reorganizations.3 If there is no principled economic justification for
chapter 11, then its defenders are left only with appeals to tradition,
and its critics understandably will insist that their notions of social jus-
tice ought to be engrafted onto the Code, or that chapter 11 be abol-
ished altogether. Austrian economics is the key that unlocks the
economic justification for chapter 11.
Simply put, chapter 11 is a market solution to the problem of corpo-
rate insolvency. It is just the type of process that Austrian economists
identify as fundamental to human action in the marketplace, given the
constraints of the real world. The ingenuity of chapter 11 is that it
extends the market process for a limited period of time while simulta-
neously suspending and preserving the non-bankruptcy rights of credi-
tors of the insolvent corporation. Not surprisingly, the historical
development of bankruptcy law reveals an early and lasting commit-
ment to such a dynamic, process solution to the problem of corporate
financial distress. To date, however, the study of chapter 11 as a mar-
ket process has not been influential in the search for an economic ex-
planation for the chapter 11 process. 2
231. Professors O'Driscoll and Rizzo have observed:
Certainly, firm owners attempt to maximize their profits through the vehicle
of their firms. The pattern of firm survival and the character of surviving
firms is not simply the result, however, of conscious planning and rational
profit maximization. The industrial landscape reflects both the results of
conscious planning and the unintended consequences of entrepreneurial in-
teraction in the marketplace. (Firms do not, for instance, normally plan their
own demise.)
O'Driscoll & Rizzo, supra note 68, at 125.
232. One exception is Professor Donald Korobkin's model of bankruptcy law as a
forum in which
competing interests are transformed, over time, into a renewed vision of the
corporation as a moral, political, social, and economic actor. Bankruptcy
law creates conditions for a special kind of discourse, one that is fundamen-
tally rehabilitative in character. No other legal system responds to the crisis
of human values arising in financial distress, or provides for a discourse for
rehabilitating these values into an informed and coherent vision of the cor-
poration as personality.
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Vahes: A Jurispndence of Bankniptcy, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 717, 766 (1991). In criticizing the creditors' bargain approach to chap-
ter 11, Korobkin notes that, in contrast to the economic account, the corporate debtor
in chapter 11 "should be seen not as merely a pool of assets; instead, the estate should
be viewed as an evolving and dynanzic enterprise, capable of having diverse aims." Id.
at 721-22 (emphasis added). In the italicized phrase, Professor Korobkin has grasped
the essential Austrian point-economic action takes place in the context of dynamic
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A. Corporate Insolvency and Plan Coordination
The fundamental problem of chapter 11 law is not, as the creditors'
bargain theorists would have it, to "facilitate achieving the asset de-
ployment of greatest benefit to the claimants [of the corporation] as a
group."233 If that is the proper question, it is indeed difficult to justify
the time-consuming, cumbersome, and often expensive process of
chapter 11. The effort to value a corporation's assets so as to achieve
an efficient bankruptcy result is a cousin of neoclassical economists'
struggle to justify why firms exist given their assumptions of perfect
knowledge and equilibrium states.234 The traditional law and eco-
nomics approach to chapter 11 falters because chapter 11 is indeed
inexplicable if we assume that the going concern value can be accu-
rately assessed and assigned by a court.
Rather, the fundamental riddle is: Why has the firm become insol-
vent? The Austrian theory of the firm explains corporations as an
overlapping web of plans, guided in part by management who (pre-
sumably with the consent of the shareholders) set a path for the com-
pany through business strategy.235 The purpose of the firm is
entrepreneurial action, which is facilitated through the coordination of
the plans and knowledge of the firm's members.236 Insolvency is a
signal to all, inside and outside the firm, that the entrepreneurial plans
which make up the firm have failed, or that the firm's particular
means of organizing and coordinating those plans and knowledge are
flawed.
Some examples are in order. Perhaps management's business strat-
egy, which is executed by management at the behest of the sharehold-
ers, was mistaken from the start (e.g., concentrating on making buggy
whips instead of automobile tires). In such a case, management must
assess the previous plan, identify the error in their strategy, and deter-
mine how, if possible, to correct the problem given that the future
course of events cannot be predicted objectively. In other words,
management must act entrepreneurially.
processes that respond to problems of ignorance and uncertainty about the future-
but he misses the implications of this insight. I discuss Professor Korobkin's views
further infra notes 318-33 and accompanying text.
233. Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 11, at 210.
234. Note Dean Jackson's framing of the issue, and its neoclassical flavor:
The critical question to be asked in examining the reorganization provisions,
then, is whether there is a net gain to the common pool from proceeding
with a reorganization instead of a liquidation .... Whether the process is a
piecemeal liquidation, a going-concern liquidation, or a reorganization,
nothing in the form of the process itself seems to call for a different standard
of allocation among claims ... in one type of proceeding than in another.
Id. at 212 (footnote omitted). Dean Jackson is correct. Of course, if the only question
is how to allocate a pool of resources, the exact nature of the process ought not make
any difference.
235. See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
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Of course, insolvency might not be caused by a failure in business
strategy. GM's business strategy is to build automobiles that the pub-
lic will buy. If GM cars do not sell, the problem might not be in man-
agement's strategy or management's plan for implementing it, but
rather in the execution of the strategy by other members of the firm.
For example, perhaps GM's cars are not selling because they are ugly.
This problem, once identified, might imply that the plans formulated
by the design department have failed and need adjustment or
reformulation.
A firm also might fail because of entirely exogenous circumstances
that may or may not be temporary. For example, perhaps GM auto-
mobile sales plummet because the price of gasoline skyrockets due to
temporary political problems in the Middle East. GM may or may not
change its plans for how it produces its products (through producing
automobiles with better gas mileage), but it likely would have to slow
production and make other changes to its production plans. On the
other hand, if an alternative mode of transportation is invented that
the consumer chooses over automobiles in ovenvhelming numbers,
GM might consider exiting the automobile business, or developing an
entirely different plan for its corporate survival. Indeed, we need not
assume such a stark change in technology to recognize that sometimes
subtle changes in consumer tastes or technology might lead GM's
products to sit in their showrooms while competitors' automobiles sell
like hot cakes.
The reasons for insolvency may be more complicated than the pre-
ceding examples. There may be no single plan within the firm that has
failed, but rather a concatenation of small failures or mis-coordination
of plans might be to blame. A thorough review of the plans that make
up the firm might be necessary in order to develop, test, and imple-
ment new plans and coordinate them with the plans of other firm
members.
On the other hand, the problem might not reside in the plans of the
firm's actors or in their coordination, but rather in the very corporate
routines or culture by which the firm fosters the localized discovery
procedures of its members. Corporate routines are spontaneously
generated over time and survive or are discarded as their efficacy is
tested by the firm's ability to meet the subjective desires of consum-
ers. Though management can attempt to revise longstanding corpo-
rate routines or culture by command, institutional folkways often are
resistant to uprooting.
Finally, the reason for the firm's descent into insolvency might defy
easy detection. In such case, corporate insolvency does provide infor-
mation that is indispensable in the market process-a signal to those
in charge of the corporation and to those to whom they are responsi-
ble that something is wrong. The entrepreneur need not be alert at all
to receive this signal loud and clear, and thus notice the opportunity
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for entrepreneurship. The problem in such case resides not in alertly
noticing the opportunity for entrepreneurship, but, rather, in assessing
how to correct the problem.
These admittedly simple examples are not meant to exhaust the list
of possibilities. Rather, they demonstrate an important Austrian as-
pect of corporate insolvency. In a world of perfect knowledge of all
relevant information, the firm's actors would recognize the flaw in the
firm's plans, wherever it may be, and respond without any friction and
without any time elapsing. In the real world of dynamic change in
consumer tastes and desires, where time passes and the world in which
we act is inherently uncertain, individuals' plans and their coordina-
tion with others' plans often fail. Once failure is apparent, in this case
through insolvency, the trick is to discover the problem and correct it.
Both steps require time, and neither step may be possible. Any legal
framework whose goal is the reorganization of insolvent firms must
provide, to the extent possible given the rights of creditors, a relatively
free environment that replicates the market process. The entrepre-
neur must be given time, information, and some assurance that her
efforts will be rewarded in the end. Thus, just as in the non-bankrupt
corporation,237 the entrepreneur is the key to a successful
reorganization.
B. Entrepreneurship and the Insolvent Corporation
As the entrepreneur of a solvent corporation is the driving force
behind the firm's success,238 the entrepreneur is also indispensable to
the reorganizing corporation as well. The Austrian theory of the firm
identifies several entrepreneurial actors within firms: (1) the share-
holders and managers who set and implement the firm's general busi-
ness strategy; (2) "intrapreneurs" who act entrepreneurially within the
firm to better integrate the plans of the firm's actors or to improve the
methods by which the firm coordinates local knowledge, either by
command or spontaneously through routines; (3) the firm's actors
themselves (including, but emphatically not limited to management)
who have joined their plans for market action with those of the other
firm actors, and are engaged in the primary purpose of the firm-
discovering knowledge which leads to the satisfaction of consumer
desires in the marketplace.
Upon insolvency, one or more entrepreneurs from one or more of
these categories must act to identify the reasons for the company's
financial distress. It is impossible to positively identify the entrepre-
neur at the moment the chapter 11 case is filed. Entrepreneurship
within an insolvent firm requires time and freedom, just as time and
freedom from interference is required outside the bankruptcy con-
237. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part I.E.
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text.239 Moreover, the entrepreneur must be assured that her job is as
stable as possible given the firm's insolvency. There is no guarantee
that the entrepreneur's ideas will be heard and implemented. After
all, in an uncertain world, it is impossible to predict perfectly today
which ideas will succeed tomorrow. Thus, errors occur in assessing
hypotheses, and sometimes the entrepreneur's ideas are ignored, even
if they are the key to curing the firm's financial malaise. Finally, there
is no guarantee that an entrepreneur of the sort described in this Arti-
cle will emerge at all, no matter how favorable the environment.
Thus, the first opportunity for entrepreneurial action in an insolvent
corporation is to identify the reasons why a firm is insolvent. It is
reasonable to assume that the entrepreneur who successfully answers
this question, if she is heard, will come from one of the categories of
intra-firm actors mentioned above. This is not invariably so, however,
and the reorganization process ought to take that fact into account.
Even if this first question is answered by an entrepreneur, however,
there is a second, equally important question to be considered: How
should the error that caused the firm to become insolvent be
corrected?
Answering this question presents a second, more challenging, en-
trepreneurial opportunity. Identifying the error with the firm's previ-
ous plan might be much easier than proposing a solution that will
work. Even if a bright marketing executive at GM believes that the
problem with GM automobile sales is that consumers find GM's car
designs unappealing, and even if that marketing executive can con-
vince the corporate decision-making team that she is correct, there is
no guarantee that GM's design department can propose a solution to
GM's design problems that consumers will find palatable.
Thus, the entrepreneur is confronted with the opportunity to dis-
cover a means to correct the firm's errant plans. Professor Harper's
view of entrepreneurial action as a learning process founded upon the
falsification of hypotheses is especially illuminating in this context.240
The entrepreneur must "learn" (in Professor Harper's sense of the
term) what the flaw in the plan is. Once the entrepreneur has learned
enough to identify the flaw, he must then suggest a new hypothesis
and, if possible, test it in the market. This process requires time.
Without time, the entrepreneur cannot act, and thus the firm stands
no chance of being successfully reorganized.
Not surprisingly, given its roots, the chapter 11 process provides the
entrepreneur with room and time to act. As described above, chapter
11 stops creditors from exercising their rights in order to give the
debtor a breathing spell.241 The provisions of chapter 11 do not as-
239. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
240. See Harper, supra note 7, at 165-205.
241. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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sume how or by whom the kinds of entrepreneurial action described
in this part will emerge, other than a general presumption that the
entrepreneur will most likely rise from within the corporation itself.
The automatic stay preserves the corporation's assets and, perhaps,
provides potential entrepreneurs within the corporation the assurance
that their jobs are stable for the moment. The exclusivity period2 42
gives the intrapreneur the first crack at proposing a plan, and thus fur-
ther incentive to act. Leaving pre-petition management in place has a
dual effect. First, the managers themselves might be the parties who
will act entrepreneurially in locating and formulating a plan to cure
the corporation's ills. Second, even if the needed entrepreneur is not
a member of management, it undoubtedly helps assuage potential in-
tra-firm entrepreneurs to continue working with the same manage-
ment that hired them in the first place. Thus, chapter 11 seeks to
preserve the corporation, to the extent possible given its financial dis-
tress, as it was before bankruptcy to foster entrepreneurial solutions
to the firm's problems.
Viewed from a market process perspective, chapter 11 permits an
internal process that mirrors how corporations act outside of bank-
ruptcy. One crucial change in legal rights, however, results from cor-
porate insolvency, even without a bankruptcy filing: The shareholders
forfeit their ownership interests in the firm, and the creditors become
in essence the firm's "owners." 43 The filing of a bankruptcy case does
not inevitably alter the ultimate rights of creditors in any major way,
other than to prevent the creditors from fully exercising the remedies
concomitant with their status. 4 The endpoint of the intra-corporate
entrepreneurial effort described in this part is the presentation to
creditors of the DIP's proposed plan of reorganization.2 45 At that
point, the entrepreneurial focus shifts from the corporation to
creditors.
C. Creditors as Venture Capitalists
The law traditionally holds that upon insolvency creditors become
the residual owners of the firm.2 46 The automatic stay prevents the
creditors from foreclosing on those rights or otherwise opting out of
chapter l1's collective proceeding.247 Creditors essentially become
242. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
246. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,
1360 (7th Cir. 1990); Forum Group, Inc. v. Harrell, 181 B.R. 379, 383 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1995), aff'd, 82 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1996); Cristopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality
and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 103, 114 (1998).
247. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic
stay).
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"investors"248 in the firm to the extent of their pre-insolvency claims.
The previous shareholders, having invested in a firm and directed the
firm's plans in a way that led to insolvency, relinquish their invest-
ment.249 Thus, creditors, for better or worse, become the decision-
makers when it comes to accepting or rejecting the firm's en-
trepreneurial plan."S The creditors have no choice (other than ignor-
ing the process entirely and receiving nothing) but to participate in
chapter l1's collective process for making that assessment.
There is a problem, however, because creditors often are ill-
equipped, either by inclination or ability, to direct insolvent firms.
Doing so requires too great an investment of time and resources in
learning about the firm's plans and how they are coordinated. On the
other hand, an insolvent firm "belongs" to the creditors. The rub is
that chapter 11 forces creditors to do more than liquidate the firm,
presumably because some firms ought to be restructured. The upshot
of the chapter 11 process is that, at a minimum, the creditors have the
right to screen the entrepreneurial plans that emerge from within the
firm. Because a chapter 11 filing prevents the creditors from liquidat-
ing the corporation, at least for the moment, the creditors are forced
by the chapter 11 process to act in a manner akin to a venture capital-
ist asked to invest in a start-up business. 1 The creditors already have
an "investment" in the firm up to the amount of their claims. In a
chapter 11 case, the entrepreneurially-generated, internal plan for cor-
recting the errors in the firm's previous plans is presented to the credi-
tors, who have no choice but to evaluate those entrepreneurial ideas
and interpret them in the face of uncertainty. 2 The creditors as a
body, however, do have one choice which flows from their right to
evaluate corporate plans: whether to liquidate the firm or to invest in
the new firm as reconstituted by the entrepreneur .2 3 Thus, the credi-
tors must themselves act as entrepreneurs in deciding whether to ac-
cept the plan. Ultimately, the choice is theirs alone, a result that is
consistent with their legal rights.
The view of creditors of an insolvent firm as analogous to venture
capitalists is important because, as Professor Harper points out:
248. Professor Christopher Frost also distinguishes between "investors" in a chap-
ter 11 debtor-those with a claim against the debtor as defined by the Code-and
"non-investors"--defined as all other interested parties who do not hold such claims.
See Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 11, at 79 n.16.
249. See supra notes 226, 246 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
251. See Harper, supra note 7, at 347-49.
252. "The [approach of Professor Harper] could be extended to the learning proce-
dures of other transactors in the market process, such as venture capitalists, who eval-
uate entrepreneurial ideas and who face difficulties of interpretation." Harper, supra
note 7, at 347.
253. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text (discussing voting on plans and
cramdown).
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The process of interpersonal criticism within the external venture
capital market is especially pertinent as an object of study [for Aus-
trian economics] because independent venture capitalists have been
relatively successful in investing in innovative business startups. It
has been suggested that the source of venture capitalists' success is
the evaluation procedures and the rigorous selection criteria that
they employ. Indeed, venture capitalists undertake intensive
screening and analysis of the projects in which they invest. During
the pre-investment phase, business proposals are subjected to suc-
cessive stages of scrutiny: prescreening, screening, evaluation, and
structuring and pricing the investment proposal. Thus, venture cap-
italist decision-making may be the paragon of critical rationalism in
the context of the growth of market knowledge.
2 54
In a chapter 11 case, the creditors do not have to screen investment
proposals. They are presented with one proposal as a result of their
legal rights in the debtor. They must evaluate the proposal, however,
with reference to their subjective view of whether it will succeed in the
marketplace.
Chapter 11 contemplates and, at least in part, facilitates this pro-
cess. The creditors must receive all the information that a reasonable
investor would require in making investment decisions before they are
asked to vote on the DIP's plan of reorganization.255 If disclosure is
insufficient, the creditors can object and will not be forced to vote on
the plan.256 As described above, chapter 11 is intended to be a negoti-
ation, not litigation.257 The creditors' contact with the DIP, through
their committee, should lead to their involvement in the formulation
of the plan.
I do not contend that the DIP must involve the creditors in the en-
trepreneurial action necessary to formulate a viable plan of reorgani-
zation. Rather, the largely unrealized emphasis on creditor
involvement in the chapter 11 process258 is meant to educate the credi-
tors early and completely regarding the venture in which they are be-
ing asked to invest. Without such information, the creditors naturally
will be uncomfortable in accepting the DIP's plan, just as the venture
capitalist will not invest in a poorly articulated speculative venture.259
Thus, chapter l's stated aspirations to cooperation between the cred-
itors and the DIP are in the best interest of both parties. The credi-
tors' vote is the result of the disclosure of the DIP's plan and the
creditors' evaluation of it. This vote is the creditors' chance to express
their best, subjective evaluation of the DIP's entrepreneurship.
254. Harper, supra note 7, at 348 (citation omitted).
255. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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D. Subjective Value
The last insight crucial to understanding chapter 11 is the concept of
subjective value. Given the nature of the chapter 11 process, it makes
little sense to speak of an objective "going concern" value that can be
calculated with any reasonable certainty. The firm has a "going con-
cern value" if the venture capitalist believes it does. In making the
decision whether to invest, the venture capitalist is faced with uncer-
tainty and imperfect information. After all, the previous owners of
the firm invested in the firm's previous plan, which has now been
proven erroneous. The venture capitalist cannot be certain that the
plan now presented is correct in identifying the previous problems
with the firm, or that the new plan is the solution to the problems
identified.
Thus, the creditors must test the hypothesis presented (the plan)
and vet it through a process of critical rationalism as described by Pro-
fessor Harper.26 Because the creditors of a firm are often numerous
and diffuse, with differing interests, difficult holdout problems arise in
asking the creditors to speak in one voice. Depending upon the diver-
sity and number of creditors, it should be no surprise that the creditors
might institute their own procedures or structures to receive, process,
and evaluate such information. Indeed, the Code provides an institu-
tion that creditors ought to employ in coordinating their collective de-
cisions-the creditors' committee. 6 1
If the creditors decide to invest-that is, if they accept the DIP's
entrepreneurial plan-it is only because, in their subjective view, the
proposed plan will work. There is no way for the creditors to objec-
tively value the reorganized debtor. Rather, the creditors must rely
upon their subjective knowledge of consumer tastes and desires, their
best guess on a number of fronts regarding the future, and their sub-
jective evaluation of the proposed plan given those assumptions. The
creditors' evaluation of the plan is colored by two legal rights vis-A-vis
the investment they have at stake in the debtor-their entitlement to
insist that the plan provide them with what they would receive in a
chapter 7 case (i.e., the liquidation value)262 and, that, if they ulti-
mately are not convinced by the DIP's entrepreneurial efforts, a liqui-
dation will be forced through conversion of the case to a chapter 7
proceeding. 3
In sum, the firm only has the value that someone is willing to pay
for it. If the creditors evaluate the plan and accept it as a group, then,
by definition, the reorganized corporation has a "going concern
value." If the creditors reject the plan, then the firm does not. Such a
260. See Harper, supra note 7, at 206-22.
261. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
263. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994).
1999] 2985
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
corporation is by definition not worth more than the creditors' ex-
isting "investment," and the firm ought to liquidate. Any other model
of the process essentially substitutes the judgment of third parties for
that of the creditors, and it is bound to fail.
E. Evidence from the History of Chapter 11
The historical antecedents of chapter 11 provide evidence of the
central role of process in corporate reorganizations. Professor Mc-
Coid, in describing the history of early English bankruptcy laws, states
that "[t]aken together, [early English statutes] reveal a natural pro-
gression from agreement to persuasion to coercion to statute, an evolu-
tion from bargain to rule that is familiar in other contexts as well as
here." '264 Thus, English bankruptcy law evolved slowly, from early at-
tempts at voluntary bargaining among creditors and debtors. As
American bankruptcy law fitfully developed in response to nineteenth
century economic disruptions, the law began to grapple with the prob-
lem of the inevitable insolvency of some number of corporations in
the increasingly industrialized United States.
At the intersection of the Gilded Age and the Industrial Revolution
in the late nineteenth century, the insolvency of railroads led creditors
and equity courts to develop rules to govern what had been developed
through voluntary bargaining among creditors.265 The court proce-
dures and rules developed through trial and error in equity courts
were eventually crystallized in the form of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, later amended in 1938 by the Chandler Act.266 Not surprisingly,
chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, which retained the essential fea-
tures of the common law composition agreement-debtor flexibility,
limited government control, debtor's management retaining the cor-
porate reins-was the chapter used most frequently to reorganize cor-
porations.267 Due to its relative popularity as a reorganization tool,
much of the old chapter XI survived the enactment of the Code in
1978.268 Thus, the "institution" of chapter 11 indeed reflects the famil-
iar process of rules developed by private parties over time, being for-
malized by courts in rules and procedures, and, eventually, codified as
law.
The history of chapter 11 illustrates the gradual development of
such a system as the nature and structure of corporations change over
time. Indeed, chapter 11 is a hybrid of spontaneous development
through necessity and legislative innovation begun in the distant past.
The purely spontaneous growth of chapter 11 law was arrested by the
264. McCoid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 184.
265. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 177-91 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
268. See Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 37-39.
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codification of equity court rules and procedures,- combined with
the statutory creditors' composition inherited by English law.270 One
would expect that the codification process was imperfect, and that a
few problems have arisen with the passage of time. Moreover, be-
cause most social institutions change over time, corporations and their
structures also develop and change. Having proposed a theory of
chapter 11 that seems consistent with its general structure and its his-
tory, it is fitting to examine the statute and nagging issues surrounding
it with the Austrian model in mind.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ECONoMic APPROACH TO
CHAPTER 11
Having outlined an approach to understanding chapter 11, the skep-
tic might ask: So what? What difference does this make for chapter
11? What does the Austrian approach explain, what does it fail to
explain, what impact does it have on the ongoing efforts to reform
chapter 11? This part surveys several issues that may have an impact
by the Austrian explanation of chapter 11 outlined above.
A. The Debtor-In-Possession
The debtor-in-possession construct has received much attention, in
both scholarly and professional circles. The discussion of the DIP cen-
ters around two perceived problems. First, because debtor's manage-
ment remains in possession of the corporation in a chapter 11, running
its day-to-day affairs and having the exclusive right to propose plans
of reorganization for the first several months of a bankruptcy case, the
incentive in many cases is for management to file for chapter 11 and
string the case along when the debtor should not be seeking to reor-
ganize at all. A second, and related, concern is that chapter 11 takes
too much time and is too costly, and that this is due in part to the
debtor's pre-petition management retaining control of the corpora-
tion. These criticisms must be understood in the context of the prefer-
ence of bankruptcy judges, one which springs in part from the Code
itself, for the debtor's management to remain in control of the
debtor-except in the most extreme cases of corporate looting or
gross corporate mismanagement.271
From the Austrian perspective, the DIP construct makes sense if
one accepts the idea that the entrepreneurial action that is necessary
to formulate a reorganization plan will most likely come from within
the corporation itself. It is a reasonable supposition, borne out by ex-
perience, that the parties that have the most at stake and that have the
most knowledge regarding the firm, its plans, its store of knowledge,
269. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
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and its corporate culture-that is, parties that already are part of the
firm-constitute the pool from which the entrepreneur will emerge. 72
The entrepreneur might be a member of management of the DIP, but
this is not necessarily, or even often, the case. The purpose of the
managers in a chapter 11 proceeding is to provide overall coordina-
tion necessary for the localized entrepreneurial process to occur. The
potential entrepreneur will be more comfortable dealing with familiar
faces, and this, in turn, will help encourage stability within the firm at
a time when the firm's plans are manifestly in disorder. Moreover, the
managers themselves will be nodal points of local firm knowledge that
would take time and expense for an outsider to acquire. From an
Austrian perspective, the retention of pre-petition management helps
foster the subjective milieu necessary for the entrepreneur to act and
to coordinate that action with the plans of the firm's ultimate decision-
makers, the creditors.273
One potential problem with this arrangement is that the plans of an
insolvent debtor's management might interfere with the necessary en-
trepreneurial action. Management is not likely to be the exclusive or
even primary source of entrepreneurial action in an insolvent corpora-
tion. Though the plans and culture of senior management of a corpo-
ration may indeed be where the problem lies, it is certainly not usually
the case that any one manager or group of managers has sufficient
information to evaluate all possible avenues for entrepreneurial action
that might possibly yield a plan that creditors will accept. Therefore,
management is important and in some cases vital to the formulation of
an entrepreneurial plan, but the retention of pre-petition management
is by no means necessary in every case. Indeed, in some cases, pre-
petition management might be a positive impediment to
entrepreneurship.
272. Of course, a third party with no previous association with the firm might have
the entrepreneurial idea upon which a plan could be formulated. Recognizing this,
the Code puts a limit on the period of time during which the debtor has the exclusive
right to propose a plan. Thus, the presumption that the entrepreneur will emerge
within the firm is rebutted by the mere passage of time.
273. Ludwig von Mises forcefully makes this point about the relationship between
entrepreneurs and managers in a general discussion of (solvent) corporations:
The entrepreneur determines alone, without any managerial interference, in
what lines of business to employ capital and how much capital to employ.
He determines the expansion and contraction of the size of the total business
and its main sections. He determines the enterprise's financial structure.
These are the essential decisions which are instrumental in the conduct of
business. They always fall upon the entrepreneur, in corporations as well as
in other types of a firm's legal structure. Any assistance given to the entre-
preneur in this regard is of ancillary character only; he takes information
about the past state of affairs from experts in the fields of law, statistics, and
technology; but the final decision implying a judgment about the future state
of the market rests with him alone. The execution of the details of his
projects may then be entrusted to managers.
Mises, Human Action, supra note 51, at 304.
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A second potential problem is that exclusivity and the automatic
stay combine to insulate the DIP almost completely from the very
creditors who will be asked to invest in the plan the debtor will even-
tually propose. Despite the oft-repeated sentiment that chapter 11 is
intended to be a process of bargaining between the DIP and the credi-
tors, just as the composition agreement was at common law, there is
little legally that creditors can do to force the DIP to negotiate and
disclose information during the process. Creditors might quite rea-
sonably deem such information important to evaluating the debtor's
plan before it is presented publicly in anticipation of a vote to take
place in short order. The creditors cannot force the debtor's manage-
ment to come to the bargaining table, and thus are frozen out of the
plan formulation process. Under chapter 11, the DIP does not have to
include creditors or even the creditors' committee in the process of
formulating a plan.274 Creditors' committees do not have much legal
recourse in the face of a DIP that discloses enough information to
meet its duty to speak to the committee, but does not negotiate with
the committee in a meaningful manner regarding the plan.275 Credi-
tors, understandably frustrated, may passively await the debtor's pro-
posal with a suspicion that secrecy shrouds some intention to gain an
unfair advantage over them.276
Outside of the chapter 11 process, if a venture capitalist is not pro-
vided the information necessary to make what she considers an in-
formed judgement regarding a possible investment, the investor
simply walks away. Entrepreneurs act through rational criticism of
plans. Without sufficient information regarding a plan that is
presented to them, the entrepreneur cannot and will not act. Due to
the collective nature of bankruptcy proceedings, creditor-investors
cannot "walk away" except by voting down a plan, or litigating over
the legal rules that govern plans in an attempt to convince the court
not to confirm the plan. Both results are counterproductive if they are
caused by dissatisfaction with the information provided to the credi-
tors during the reorganization process.
As outlined above, there are two entrepreneurial steps necessary
for a successful reorganization.2 7 Once a plan of reorganization has
been proposed, the creditors must be convinced to invest in the plan.
Previously, a third party referee was on the scene to supervise the
reorganization effort. Presumably, this gave creditors some assurance
that their interests were protected and, perhaps more importantly,
that the referee was an information-coordinating "node" within the
bankruptcy process. The referee was an neutral source for informa-
274. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
275. See Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Reorganiza-
tion Cases, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 385, 396 (1998).
276. The author has frequently witnessed this himself.
277. See supra Part III.B.
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tion regarding the DIP's progress in formulating a plan. When chap-
ter 11 was first enacted, the referee position was split into two
different offices, the Bankruptcy Judge and the U.S. trustee.278 Thus,
there no longer is any neutral actor in the reorganization process who
can act as a liaison between the DIP and the creditors. The result,
from an Austrian perspective, is that Congress rightfully provided
maximum scope for the DIP's entrepreneurial action, without con-
comitantly providing similar flexibility for creditors to act
entrepreneurially.
The upshot is that the Code ought to foster a closer relationship
between the DIP and the creditors during the plan formation process.
Several possible solutions have been suggested. First, courts could
take a more active role by devising mechanisms by which the debtor's
management fulfills its obligation to negotiate and work with creditors
through the plan negotiation process.279 Solutions of this sort, how-
278. See supra notes 212 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. trustee).
279. Professor Frost emphasizes the importance of leverage in the relationship be-
tween the debtor's management and creditors, and, suggesting that courts take a
greater role in evaluating the behavior of the debtor's management using current
chapter 11 provisions, concludes:
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 dramatically changed the governance
of corporations reorganizing under its provisions by eliminating the require-
ment of a mandatory independent trustee. The chief purpose behind the
presumption that the debtor's management would continue to run the busi-
ness was to reduce the disruption of the general business operations
throughout the reorganization process. The concept of a "debtor in posses-
sion" left management with far broader powers, however.
If bankruptcy is believed to be simply a process for redeployment of assets
and redistribution of claims against those assets on an economically efficient
basis, management control and allegiances may introduce opportunities for
strategic behavior that is inconsistent with the rationale of the process. Cor-
porations that economically should be liquidated may be reorganized and
vice versa. If, on the other hand, bankruptcy is viewed as a means through
which losses can be distributed to pre-bankruptcy claimants while the corpo-
ration undergoing the process stays in business and continues to contribute
to the community through providing employment, paying taxes, etc., the
same strategic influences may infect the process.
The solution to these difficulties requires little structural reform. In many
cases, courts may be able to approximate the non-bankruptcy governance
system by including a determination of the corporation's asset value in the
other factors they use to evaluate contested business decisions. By deter-
mining the asset value, courts may determine which group holds the residual
claims on the corporation's assets. Like the non-bankruptcy system, the
court could then give the views of that group on the business decision the
most weight in the decision making process.
Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Re-
organizations, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 89, 139-40 (1992). Naturally, an Austrian approach
does not view chapter 11 strictly as an effort to redeploy corporate assets in an eco-
nomically efficient manner or primarily as an opportunity to distribute losses to pre-
petition claimants, but the essential insight regarding management incentives remains
valid.
2990 [Vol. 67
TIME, UNCERTAINTY, & CHAPTER 11
ever, risk the increased role of the bankruptcy judge in corporate en-
trepreneurial decision-making, a result that chapter 11 sought to avoid
and that bankruptcy judges themselves are neither disposed nor
equipped to undertake." ° Second, chapter 11 could be revised to re-
adjust the incentives for the debtor's management to deal with the
creditors during the formulation of the plan of reorganization. One
possibility that has been proposed by scholars is to replace the
debtor's management, either entirely or partially, with an independent
third party who will make decisions in areas where the debtor's man-
agement would be most likely to elevate their own interests over that
of the corporation.z" l From an Austrian perspective, however, any
such solution might undercut the advantage of having the debtor's
management in place. Replacing the present system with a mandatory
trustee in every case might simply solve a problem inherent in some
cases at the expense of creating problems in others.
Recently, Professor Cuevas proposed a creditor "vote of no confi-
dence" that would permit the creditors to vote collectively for the
ouster of the debtor's management in favor of a party chosen by the
creditors.' From an Austrian perspective, the creditors, as investors
in the insolvent corporation, ought to be able to replace management
that is interfering with the creditors' ability to evaluate the very en-
trepreneurial plans whose formulation is crucial to the process. Such
a no-confidence vote would be a last resort. Voting in a bankruptcy
case is a cumbersome and expensive process that would eat up addi-
tional estate assets in the form of attorneys' and professional fees.
Creditors ought to be willing to suffer small slights and minor friction
with the DIP's management in order to save the expense of such a
vote. If, however, in the subjective view of the creditors, the debtor's
management must be displaced in order for the creditors to evaluate
any entrepreneurial plan that emerges from the debtor, then, to use an
old phrase, it's their nickel. The creditors, whose investment in the
debtor is at stake in this process, are in the best position to gauge
whether the efforts of the DIP will be successful.
Perhaps tension is inevitable between the DIP's role in formulating
an entrepreneurial plan for the debtor's future, and the creditors who,
themselves acting entrepreneurially, must evaluate it. Presently, chap-
ter 11 fosters the former at the expense of the latter, and this imbal-
ance ought to be redressed. Giving creditors the ability to hire new
managers would provide an option for creditors that would not be
280. For example, Professor Frost suggests that judicial valuation of corporate as-
sets ought to be employed to determine which group's voice should be weighted most
in the reorganization process. See id.
281. See Adams, supra note 160, at 621-33 (proposing appointment of a trustee to
make "fundamental bankruptcy decisions").
282. See Cuevas, supra note 208 (proposing a "vote of no confidence" for
creditors).
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exercised lightly. In the end, the creditors' subjective evaluation of
the DIP's management and plans truly does matter. After all, the
creditors' subjective view of the debtor's plan will determine the cor-
poration's future. Some creditors inevitably will err in making this
decision. Leaving this decision to them (instead of mandating it in
every case or leaving it up to the bankruptcy court), however, is the
best means by which the chapter 11 process can foster the necessary
entrepreneurial action on the part of the creditors in evaluating the
plan of reorganization.
B. The Role of the Bankruptcy Court
Much the same as law professors, bankruptcy judges and other
bankruptcy professionals cannot agree on what constitutes "success"
in a chapter 11 case." 3 Some believe that a successful chapter 11 is
one where a plan is confirmed.' Others wish to account for the in-
terests of the communities in which they live and work.28 5 Still others
believe that chapter 11 ultimately is for returning as much money to
the creditors as possible." 6
The Austrian model of chapter 11 makes it possible to better define
the role that the bankruptcy court ought to play. First, the subjective
nature of economic values such as a corporation's going concern value
dictates that, to the extent possible, the bankruptcy court should not
be in the business of making such calculations. Indeed, in railroad
receiverships, the court's role was limited to setting a minimum bid,
which the reorganization committee had to meet or exceed in order to
purchase the debtor's assets. Similarly, the Code provides that credi-
tors are entitled to insist that they receive on account of their claims at
least what they would receive if the debtor were liquidated.28 7 In an
ideal world of few creditors and no holdout problems, such a calcula-
tion would not be necessary. Instead, whatever the creditors negoti-
ated by definition would reflect the proper subjective valuation of the
corporation.
A core problem that bankruptcy seeks to cure, however, is how to
formulate and effectuate a plan of reorganization in a world where
there may be many, widely scattered creditors even in the most mod-
est commercial enterprise. Moreover, though still fraught with the
problems inherent in any hypothetical valuation of assets, it is gener-
ally the case that the liquidation value of hard assets can be measured
283. For an excellent general discussion of different perspectives on "successful"
chapter 11 cases, despite one participant's gratuitous (though forgivable) pique at
"misinformed professors" meddling with chapter 11, see Leif M. Clark et al., What
Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.
Rev. 229, 240-45 (1994).
284. See id. at 229.
285. See id. at 230.
286. See id.
287. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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with greater accuracy than the "going concern value" of a corporation.
The market for scrap presumably is larger, with many more partici-
pants, than the market for corporations as going concerns. The inabil-
ity to calculate an objective "going concern value" means that market-
based, chapter 11 reform proposals that hinge upon an auction or a
reliance on a capital market evaluation of the corporation's "value"
are doomed to failure in most corporate reorganization cases. Stran-
gers to the corporation are at a great informational disadvantage
when it comes to evaluating corporate financial information. The
smaller the corporation, the greater the disadvantage, particularly in
the face of a recalcitrant debtor. Moreover, unless the debtor is very
large, the information necessary to construct or evaluate en-
trepreneurial plans of the debtor will not be publicly available. The
only alternative is for entrepreneurs within the firm to formulate a
plan for the creditors to critically evaluate.
Thus, the Austrian approach points to a very limited role for the
bankruptcy court in assessing the "going concern value" of the corpo-
ration or the chances of success for the plan itself. It ought not to be
the province of a government official-though that official is stipu-
lated to be diligent, intelligent, and honest-to assess the economic
value or viability of entrepreneurial plans. The bankruptcy judge is
ill-equipped to process the information necessary to make decisions
regarding the "feasibility" of a proposed plan, or to make any judg-
ments about value beyond setting the liquidation price. Therefore,
the Code should be amended to eliminate the "feasibility" require-
ment for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. Such a determination
ought to be made by the investors using their subjective assessment of
the plan. It is the heart of the chapter 11 process. The corporation
will survive if its owners accept the entrepreneur's designs for its fu-
ture. If there is a legitimate problem with certain creditors' interests
being protected through the plan confirmation process, the problem
ought to be solved by revising chapter l's voting procedures to en-
sure the appropriate voice for such creditors in the proceedings.
In a similar vein, all reform proposals that empower the court to
evaluate a plan in light of other, societal considerations suffer from
the same flaw. The court does not have the information necessary to
evaluate a tradeoff between the interests of the creditors and other
"stakeholders."' 1 8 Attempts to import redistributive ideals into the
chapter 11 process doom reorganized corporations to failure, for the
288. Professor Frost, has made this point eloquently, though from a slightly differ-
ent point of view:
The bankruptcy process is institutionally incapable of resolving the loss dis-
tribution issues among all who are interested in the outcome of the case.
Even assuming that the social costs accompanying business failure should be
spread over a broad base, the judicial system is particularly ill-equipped to
make the types of judgments required to distribute losses in a way that bears
any resemblance to rational policy.
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same reasons that government interference in corporate decision-
making would doom corporations to failure outside of bankruptcy.28 9
Having thus defined what the court should not do, it might fairly be
asked: What should be the role of the court in a chapter 11 case?
Simply put, the bankruptcy court should do what any court does
best-settle the legal disputes brought before it. Chapter 11 should
limit such disputes to the extent possible to those that safeguard (but
do not meddle with) the process itself. Such litigation would, of
course, include disputes over some of the core legal constructs neces-
sary to the bankruptcy process-for example, the bankruptcy estate,
order and priority of distribution and litigation over the viability and
scope of claims. In sum, the court should recognize that a chapter 11
primarily is not a lawsuit, it is a forced workout of a troubled business.
As such, chapter 11 ought to restrict the court's role as much as possi-
ble to questions of law, and permit the business people to take care of
business.
C. Absolute Priority Rule and the New Value Exception
If a class of creditors does not vote for a plan of reorganization, the
plan nonetheless may be (in the colorful language of the marketplace)
"crammed down" their throats-that is, the plan may be confirmed
over that class's dissent so long as certain requirements are met.290
One of those requirements is the absolute priority rule-no junior
class of creditors or equity holders may receive or retain any property
or value on account of that junior claim or interest unless senior
classes of claims or interests consent or are paid in full.291
The history of the absolute priority rule is rich and much debated,
and I will not recite it at length here.2g Suffice it to say that the
Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 11, at 77; see also Ronald J. Mann, Bank-
ruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 1057 (1995) (asserting that public policy, not notions of justice,
should drive the substantive content of chapter 11); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay
on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 42 (arguing
that maximizing creditor returns is social justice); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory
Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1817 n.45 (1998) (arguing that
protecting "community interests" in bankruptcy "is bad public policy").
289. See Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 11, at 76-77.
290. For the definitive, in my opinion, discussions of the mechanics of cram-downs,
see Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133 (1979); and Kenneth N. Klee, Cram
Down 11, 64 Am. Bankr. L.J. 229 (1990).
291. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)&(C) (1994).
292. Professor McCoid provides a brief summary of the history of the absolute pri-
ority rule in his article concerning the history of the bankruptcy discharge. See Mc-
Coid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 165-81; see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute
Priority After Ahlers, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 963, 969-79 (1989) (arguing that the "statutory
branch" of the absolute priority doctrine is not really statutory); Walter J. Blum, The
Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 565, 565-71
(1950) (discussing corporate reorganizations under the National Bankruptcy Act);
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Supreme Court fashioned the absolute priority rule in the context of
railroad equity receiverships.293 The Court later engrafted the re-
quirement of absolute priority onto the Bankruptcy Act by deeming it
a component of the Act's requirement that a plan of reorganization be
"fair and equitable. ' 294 The "fair and equitable" test, which silently
subsumed the absolute priority rule, was codified in chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act with the passage of the Chandler Act.295 The effect
of the rule was that a valuation of every debtor corporation had to be
performed in every case. 96 On the other hand, chapter XI of the Act
only required that the plan meet the "best interests of creditors" test
which entitled creditors to insist upon the liquidation value of their
claims.2 97 As one commentator has noted, the "nightmare" of apply-
ing the absolute priority rule in practice led to debtors "vot[ing] with
their feet" by overwhelmingly choosing chapter XI of the Act over
chapter X.298
The drafters of chapter 11 codified the absolute priority rule as a
part of the test for whether a reorganization plan is "fair and equita-
ble. ' 299 This decision was controversial due to the inherent tension
Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absohte Priority Doctrine in Corporate
Reorganizations, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 651, 652-53 (1974) (identifying the development
of the doctrine and the nature of it as the two major reasons that discussion of bank-
ruptcy is so difficult).
293. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-08 (1913); Mississippi &
Missouri R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392, 413 (1868). Professor McCoid
argues that the absolute priority rule makes sense in the context of equity receiver-
ships that were essentially creditor collection devices, but that it is not well-suited to a
view of bankruptcy as rooted in the common law composition. See McCoid, Dis-
charge, supra note 160, at 186-88.
In the receivership context, absolute priority was a perfectly appropriate rule
of decision because receivership in theory was a collection device pure and
simple. The receiver's job was to assemble the assets of the debtor, sell
them, and distribute the proceeds to creditors, with the debtor or its owners
being entitled to a portion only after creditors were paid in full. The element
of consent or statutory mandate essential to composition was missing. Only
had the Court been prepared to permit the imposition of composition on
objecting creditors as a matter of "equity" would a different result have been
possible.
Id at 187.
294. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118-19 (1939).
295. See Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 858-59.
296. See id at 854.
297. See id. at 859.
298. Id. The problem was wvith the requirement of a valuation of the debtor. Pro-
fessor Tabb has written:
The required judicial proceeding to establish the debtor's reorganization
value was time-consuming and expensive. Delay could be fatal for a trou-
bled enterprise. Even worse, the necessary underlying "premise of a valid
and reliable valuation is specious or inflexible or illusory." In an oft-quoted
phrase, the valuation was "a guess compounded by an estimate."
Id- (citations omitted).
299. The "fair and equitable" standard must be satisfied before a plan can be
crammed down. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
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between the "best interests of creditors" test and the absolute priority
rule. Commenting on the drafters' concerns as they considered pro-
posals for a middle ground between the two, Professor McCoid has
stated:
[T]he role of... the owners of a corporate debtor required to effect
a successful reorganization may range from a substantial, even in-
dispensable, effort to virtually nothing at all. A fixed allocation be-
tween the extremes of absolute priority and best interests would fail
to reflect important differences among the cases. And so.... Con-
gress sought to provide incentives which would lead to debtor and
majority creditor agreement on the subject. The debtor, who ordi-
narily formulates the plan, must make an offer attractive enough to
avoid rejection by a creditor class which, if it occurred, would be
followed either by the absolute priority required in a cramdown or
by a liquidation. On the other side, the creditors risk liquidation
and consequent loss of any share of a going concern surplus if they
fail to come to terms. The theory is that the parties will bargain for
a composition result which divides the going concern surplus to
their mutual advantage. 300
Thus, the absolute priority rule provides a legal constraint to pro-
tect creditors in addition to the best interests test (which I have char-
acterized throughout this paper as protecting the creditors'
"investment" in the debtor). The DIP (or any other plan proponent,
for that matter) knows that if a class of creditors rejects the plan, then
they are entitled to insist not just that their investment be protected,
but that their non-bankruptcy rights to repayment of that investment
before other, lower priority investors, will also be preserved. It is not
surprising that in a scheme where bargaining within general proce-
dural rules is the model, that any forced, group-imposed, solution to
holdout classes of creditors will contain heightened substantive safe-
guards to protect the holdouts. After all, the holdouts might be right
to hold out-there is always the possibility that the majority of credi-
tors might vote to confirm a plan for reasons having nothing to do
with the entrepreneurial merits of the plan. This problem is poten-
tially heightened where one large creditor, often an under-secured
creditor with a large deficiency claim, effectively controls the impaired
class that votes in favor of the plan over the objection of other im-
paired classes. Though holdout classes in such a case may be over-
ruled by a majority vote, their coerced investment is protected both in
amount and in priority of payment due to the interplay of the best
interests test and the absolute priority rule.30 1
300. McCoid, Discharge, supra note 160, at 190.
301. For general discussions of the absolute priority rule, see Ayer, supra note 292;
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of
the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 738 (1988); Lynn M. LoPucki & William
C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125 (1990); Bruce A. Markell,
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This naturally brings us to the uncodified "new value" exception to
the absolute priority rule. The Supreme Court first explicitly formu-
lated the new value exception in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod-
ucts Co.,3°2 wherein the Court stated:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which
stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insol-
vent debtor.... Where [the necessity of funding a plan by old equi-
tyholders] exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution
and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their
contribution, no objection can be made.?0 3
The Court went on to define "new value" as a contribution "in money
or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circum-
stances to the participation of the stockholder. ' a3(
The "new value" exception has never been codified, and does not
appear in the Code. Thus, it is uncertain whether the Supreme
Court's discussion of new value in Los Angeles Lumber survived the
specific codification of the absolute priority rule in chapter 11. 3 -
From a market-process perspective, however, the new value exception
appears eminently sensible.ce It is true of many corporations, espe-
cially closely-held companies or those whose primary asset is one
Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L
Rev. 69 (1991); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Banknptcy Reorganization Plans:
Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 Emory LJ. 1009 (1987); David A.
Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Banknptcy's Contribution Rule Doc-
trine After Ahlers, 63 Am. Bankr. LI. 221 (1989); Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of
Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 9.
302. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
303. Id. at 121.
304. Id. at 122.
305. Compare In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that new value exception exists), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties
XVIII, 961 F.2d 496,504-05 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that plan which permitted limited
partners to make new capital contributions was not "fair and equitable" to first mort-
gagee's unsecured claim). For a general discussion of the debate, see Tabb, The Law
of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 874-80.
306. The Seventh Circuit agrees:
Creditors effectively own bankrupt firms. They may find it worthwhile, as
owners, to sell equity claims to the managers; they may even find it worth-
while to give the equity away in order to induce managers to stay on and
work hard. Because the Code allows creditors to consent to a plan that im-
pairs their interests, voluntary transactions of this kind are possible. Only
collective action problems could frustrate beneficial arrangements. If there
are many creditors, one may hold out, seeking to engross a greater share of
the gains. But the Code deals with holdups by allowing half of a class by
number (two-thirds by value) to consent to a lower class's retention of an
interest. Creditors not acting in good faith do not count toward the one-
third required to block approval. When there is value to be gained by al-
lowing a lower class to kick in new value and keep its interest, the creditors
should be willing to go along.
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
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piece of real property, that there is no entrepreneurial alternative to a
capital infusion from existing shareholders. There simply might not
be any other source of cash or expertise necessary for running the
reorganized corporation. The existing shareholders, which often are
also officers of the company, must make an additional investment, or
the corporation will be liquidated. In such cases, an overly rigorous
application of the absolute priority rule raises the specter of holdouts
among the creditors. On the other hand, whenever shareholders of an
insolvent corporation receive something under a plan, the creditors
will be understandably suspicious of collusion between the sharehold-
ers and the DIP. Moreover, as Professor Tabb has pointed out, even if
one accepts the notion that shareholders ought to be given the oppor-
tunity to fund a plan of reorganization, and that such a plan might be
the only option in many cases, creditors are often upset because "they
have no say in the matter, and no chance to offer a competing plan, or
to make a contribution themselves. 30 7
Thus, the practical interplay between the new value exception,
where recognized, and the exclusivity period deprives creditors of the
ability to negotiate effectively concerning the pre-petition equity-
holders' position in the reorganized corporation where such share-
holders present a "new-value plan." The focus of the confirmation
inquiry will be whether the shareholders' new value is approximately
equal to the interest in the reorganized company that those sharehold-
ers will receive under the plan. This, in turn, requires that the court
discern the value of the shareholders contribution and their ultimate
interest in the reorganized debtor. Though in any given case both val-
uations may be speculative, in almost every case the latter valuation
will be a "guess compounded by an estimate. '30 8
Scholars have suggested two ways to extricate creditors from the
corner into which a DIP can paint them through a new-value plan.
The first is to conduct an auction of the debtor's proposed interests in
the reorganized debtor.3 09 If a third party is willing to pay more for
307. Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 878.
308. See supra note 298.
309. See Markell, supra note 301. This approach has been implemented by at least
one court. See In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1010-11 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991); see also Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualization of the Absolute
Priority Rule and Its New Value Exception, 1993 Det. C.L. Rev. 1445, 1485-86 (discuss-
ing a two-prong revision to the operation of the current new value exception); John T.
Bailey, The "New Value Exception" in Single-Asset Reorganizations: A Commentary
on the Bjolmes Auction Procedure and Its Relationship to Chapter 11, 98 Com. L.J. 50,
67 (1993) (discussing expediency as an advantage of auctions); Linda J. Rusch, The
New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Reorganizations:
What Should the Rule Be?, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 1311, 1325-36 (1992) (discussing the ap-
plication of the new value exception to allow reorganization with owner participation
over the objection of unsecured creditors); Anthony L. Miscioscia, Jr., Note, The
Bankruptcy Code and the New Value Doctrine: An Examination Into History, Illlu-
sions, and the Need for Competitive Bidding, 79 Va. L. Rev. 917, 945-56 (1993) (adres-
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the interest in the reorganized corporation than is granted to existing
shareholders under a new-value plan, then presumably the court
would "sell" that interest to the highest bidder. 10 If there are no bid-
ders, then the court may rely on the fact that a market-process valua-
tion of the interest has revealed it to be at most equal to the amount
of the new value injected by the old shareholders.
This ingenious solution is a step in the right direction, but I fear it
suffers from the same problem as other market solutions in chapter 11
literature. It is difficult to believe, given present practical constraints
on creditors' obtaining information from a DIP, that a third party
often would have enough information on a timely basis to effectively
gauge whether an effective plan could be formulated for the amount
to be contributed to fund such a plan. Put in Austrian terms, there
will be few instances where a third party could act entrepreneurially.
A fortiorari, one might doubt that there will often be third-party bids
in such "new value auctions." The potential information advantages
of the existing shareholders (who appointed the managers running the
DIP) are too great to rely on this solution in all cases.
Professor Tabb mentions another possibility that holds greater
promise: sever the link between exclusivity and new value.3 1 Under
this proposal, once a new-value, cram-down plan is proposed, then the
debtor's ability to keep dissenting creditors from formulating and sub-
mitting their own plans for creditor evaluation is ended.31 2 Some ap-
propriate time period should be permitted for third parties to gather
the information necessary to formulate plans on their own. The DIP
should be required to disclose such information promptly. If alternate
plans are filed, then the creditors would vote in order to determine
which plan ought to be confirmed. If no alternate plans are filed, then
the DIP may proceed with the confirmation of its plan without regard
to the absolute priority rule, the investors having not proposed an al-
ternative to participation by existing shareholders in the reorganized
debtor.313
This proposal has the enormous appeal of directing third parties to
act within a dynamic context of plan evaluation and formulation,
rather than engaging all parties in a complex dispute over valuations
that are rightly described as mere conjecture. Moreover, if sufficient
sing section 1129(b)'s implications concerning the debtor's right to submit a plan of
reorganization and the need to conduct an auction in the event of a cramdowvn).
310. See Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, supra note 170, at 878-79 (citing Markell,
supra note 301; In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.Rt 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)).
311. See id. at 879. Indeed, as this Article went to press, the Supreme Court hinted
very strongly that the link between exclusivity and new value plans be severed to
avoid violations of the absolute priority rule. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Assoc. v. 203 N. Lasalle St. Partnership, No. 97-1418, 1999 WL 257031 (U.S. May 3,
1999).
312. See id.
313. See id.
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opportunity for entrepreneurship is permitted, the process might yield
plans that creditors as a body would consider preferable to that of the
DIP. From an Austrian perspective, such a process is vital to success-
ful entrepreneurship, and is the only effective antidote for the head-
ache caused by the extant approach to evaluating and confirming new-
value plans in those courts that permit them.
The foregoing are some of the bankruptcy issues that are illumi-
nated by the insights of Austrian economics. I do not pretend that this
discussion exhausts the possibilities. Indeed, I earnestly hope the op-
posite-that the Austrian economic approach outlined above will
open additional avenues of scholarly inquiry.
D. Professors Frost and Korobkin, and the Purpose of the Chapter
11 Process
Finally, a word is in order about previous scholarly discussions of
the importance of a process-oriented response to corporate financial
distress. To a significant degree, Professors Christopher Frost and
Donald Korobkin have grasped the importance of a process-oriented
corporate reorganization statute, each from a different perspective. 4
Professor Frost notes that a process is necessary in a world of uncer-
tainty because "asset deployment decisions cannot be characterized as
'correct' or 'maximizing.' It makes sense to discuss asset deployment
issues only in terms of the process through which such decisions are
made. '315 Frost states that "the process through which asset deploy-
ment decisions are made should locate decision-making power in the
hands of those holding incentives to maximize economic value. '316
Frost then goes on to emphasize the importance of bargaining lever-
age and economic self-interest in the corporate reorganization process
in an effort (successful, in my opinion) to defend chapter 11 against
reform proposals which give "non-investor" interests a role in the pro-
cess through the agency of the bankruptcy judge.
I wholeheartedly endorse most of Professor Frost's conclusions,1 7
which flow from the Austrian premise that a process solution makes
sense in an uncertain world.318 Frost does not, however, fully expli-
314. See Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 11, at 79 (emphasizing a "process-
oriented view of asset deployment issues"). For some representative quotations from
Professor Korobkin's work and a brief description of his model of corporate reorgani-
zations, see supra note 232 and accompanying text, and infra notes 318-99 and accom-
panying text. See also Adams, supra note 160, at 629 (suggesting a "process-based
approach" to valuation in chapter 11).
315. Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 11, at 79.
316. Id.
317. Indeed, some of the conclusions of Part IV.B. of this paper are congruent to
those of Professor Frost on the role of the bankruptcy judge. See Frost, Redistributive
Policies, supra note 11, at 126-35.
318. Indeed, Professor Frost cites the work of economist Joseph Schumpeter, who
viewed capitalism as a process of "creative destruction" and who stressed the impor-
tance of the entrepreneur. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Dc-
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cate the implications of the chapter 11 process, nor does he provide a
complete, subjectivist explanation for the inevitability of such a pro-
cess and the centrality of entrepreneurship to it. As outlined above,
Austrian economic theory opens the door to such an overarching justi-
fication for the chapter 11 process.319
Professor Frost marshaled these conclusions largely in response to
Professor Korobkin, who views bankruptcy as an attempt to grapple
with "moral, political, personal, social, and economic" effects of cor-
porate insolvency, including the effects on parties not directly in-
volved in the bankruptcy case.3 0 Korobkin calls his explanation of
chapter 11 a "value-based" account that "[1loosely speaking, . . . ac-
complishes a kind of 'group therapy': the values of the participants in
financial distress are rehabilitated into a coherent and informed vision
of what the [bankruptcy] estate as enterprise shall exist to do."321
Thus, to Korobkin the corporation is like an individual in that it is a
"moral, political, and social actor" with a personality that can
change." - Chapter 11 recognizes a corporation's "dynamic potential"
and provides a means of "bringing the corporation's dynamic person-
ality into public view and regulating not merely its economic division,
but the playing out of its moral, political, and social values." 3 3 Chap-
ter 11 is a "rehabilitative discourse"32 4 that takes into account the in-
terests of not only the parties to the bankruptcy process, but others
affected by the prospects for the continued viability of the corporation
as well. 3" Professor Korobkin obviously understands that process is
the key to chapter 11. Rather than focus on the individuals who make
up the firm as the locus of economic action, however, he anthropo-
morphizes the insolvent firm into a needy individual in need of reha-
bilitation through discourse. As the Austrian model outlined here
mocracy 81, 130 (3d ed. 1950). Schumpeter was influenced by, but not an adherent of
the Austrian School. As Professor Kirzner has written:
What needs to be introduced into Schumpeter's vision of the economic sys-
tern is recognition of the role of [the market process of] entrepreneurial
alertness and imagination, in inspiring and driving th[e] market process of
knowledge mobilization-in the face of the stark uncertainties of an un-
known future. It was Schumpeter's failure-towering pioneer though he
was in understanding the entrepreneurial role-to grasp the subjective di-
mension of th[e] market process ....
Kirzner, The Meaning of Market Process, supra note 8, at 76.
319. See supra Part III.
320. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Vahes, supra note 11, at 721.
321. Id at 722.
322. See id at 745.
323. Id
324. This characterization of Professor Korobkin is attributable to Professor Frost.
See Frost, supra note 11, at 87.
325. See Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 11, at 762-63. These other
groups include employees, the government, the community, shareholders, and poten-
tially others. See id at 763.
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explains, though, Professor Korobkin's approach misapprehends the
reasons for the process.
First, chapter 11 has its roots in common law creditors' composi-
tions and in the railroad equity receiverships of the late nineteenth
century.326 The evidence suggests that both historical antecedents of
the chapter 11 process were devised solely for the benefit of creditors.
Other parties affected by the success or failure of reorganization ef-
forts were not given a seat at the table to air through group discourse
their interests and views regarding the future "personality" of the
debtor. On the contrary, creditors of railroads formulated reorganiza-
tion plans that, in turn, were presented to a reorganization committee
made up of creditors, who then effectively purchased the insolvent
corporation through the plan for some value above the liquidation
price.3 7 The equity court's role seems to have been limited to sniffing
out collusion in the form of too low a price paid for the debtor under
the reorganization committee's proposal.328
Second, though Professor Korobkin's "group therapy" might be
viewed as a version of Professor Harper's growth-of-knowledge model
of entrepreneurship,3"9 it does not follow that interest groups other
than the creditors are, or ought to be, included. Entrepreneurs tend
to notice what is in their interest to notice. The Austrian entrepreneur
applies her skills either to discover opportunities through alertness
(Kirzner),33 ° or to hypothesize, falsify, and reformulate hypotheses in
an effort to capitalize on perceived opportunities (Harper), 33' all with
the intent to remedy gaps in the market. Entrepreneurial action is
essential to the process by which knowledge grows, innovation occurs,
and consumer tastes and demands are satisfied.
The key, however, is ensuring that the entrepreneur's attention is
directed to noticing and capitalizing on such opportunities. When a
corporation becomes insolvent, there are severe problems with coor-
dinating intra-firm plans due to the disruption caused by a firm not
paying its bills. Employees and other creditors may worry about get-
ting paid. Key managers may wish to jump the sinking ship. Suppliers
are wary of ongoing relationships with the insolvent corporation. In
this atmosphere, only a continuation of the market process and pre-
insolvency entrepreneurial action potentially will yield a plan that will
result in a confirmed plan of reorganization. The introduction of
other groups affected by the insolvency of the firm introduces the pos-
sibility of plans being introduced (and perhaps even gaining ascen-
dancy) in the chapter 11 process that are not the result of a true
326. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing Kirzner).
331. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing Harper).
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market process. Entrepreneurial action will not be directed at the ul-
timate goal of presenting a workable reorganization plan to the inves-
tors (the creditors).332 Thus, such plans will fail either because the
investors will not accept them, or, being forced to accept the plan, it
will ultimately not be successful in practice. Indeed, such proposals
are, on a smaller scale and in a local context, no different than central-
ized economic planning on a market level, an experiment whose disas-
trous result Austrian economists such as Friedrich Hayek accurately
predicted and explained long before it finally was rejected.333
CONCLUSION
Austrian economics emphasizes methodological individualism, the
subjectiveness of economic calculations, and human action in the face
of uncertainty and the passage of real time. Traditional law and eco-
nomics scholarship, which is derived from neoclassical economic mod-
els, largely has not explored these themes in examining the law. The
result is that durable legal institutions are criticized as not having a
rational, economic justification to support their expense. Into this
vacuum rush those that wish to abolish such institutions entirely or
reform them to fit their own notions of social justice.
This dynamic has played out in the context of corporate reorganiza-
tion law through the debate between the "free marketers," "tradition-
alists," and others. Until now, however, there has been no attempt to
view chapter 11 through the lens of Austrian economic theory. In do-
ing exactly that in this Article, I conclude that the key to chapter 11 is
that it provides a two-step process. Time and a relatively unfettered
scope for entrepreneurial action are afforded in order to formulate a
plan to reorganize the debtor corporation that the debtor's creditors
will screen, much as if they were venture capitalists.
This process, like the market process in general, will be imperfect.
Creditors might be ill-equipped to act as venture capitalists. There
may be perverse incentives on the part of the entrepreneur which
leads to plans that are bound to fail. It is only by preserving the envi-
ronment necessary for entrepreneurship, however, that the process
can yield the innovation necessary to reconstitute the firm. Any the-
ory of chapter 11 that ignores the central roles of time, uncertainty,
and entrepreneurial action in reorganizing an insolvent corporation
seeks theoretical precision at the expense of practical exposition.
Few legal scholars have embraced Austrian economics-I daresay
very few have even heard of it. The Austrian economic approach,
however, holds tremendous potential for the profitable study of legal
332. See Mises, Human Action, supra note 51, at 704 ("In labor disputes the parties
are not management and labor, but entrepreneurship... and the salaried and wage-
receiving employees.").
333. See Hayek, Road to Serfdom, supra note 52.
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institutions, particularly in fields such as antitrust, intellectual prop-
erty, and corporate law. I believe this Article is an example of such
work, and I hope that others will follow in the Austrian tradition.
